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                  IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
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                           Norfolk Division
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        IN RE:
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               ZETIA (EZETIMIBE)
                                              CIVIL ACTION NO.
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               ANTITRUST LITIGATION
                                              2:18md2836
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                       TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                           Norfolk, Virginia
13
                             April 14, 2023
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     BEFORE: THE HONORABLE REBECCA BEACH SMITH
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               United States District Judge
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1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED: 2 KIRKLAND & ELLIS, LLP 3 Kevin M. Neylan, Jr. Devora W. Allon 4 Patrick J. Gallagher James R.P. Hileman 5 And WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK 6 By: Richard H. Ottinger Jennifer L. Eaton Counsel for Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., 7 and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA 8 incorrectly identified as Glenmark Generics, Inc., USA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 24 25

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(Hearing commenced at 1:03 p.m.)
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              THE CLERK: In Re: Zetia Antitrust Litigation,
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     Case Number 2:18md2836.
              Are the parties ready to proceed?
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              MR. MONROE: Your Honor, Bill Monroe representing
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     the direct purchasers. We are ready to proceed.
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              THE COURT: The direct purchasers are ready to
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    proceed?
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              MR. MONROE: Yes.
                                 Thank you.
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              MR. CALES: Your Honor, Jim Cales on behalf of the
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     end payor purchasers. We are ready to proceed.
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              MR. SAWYER: Your Honor, John Sawyer on behalf of
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     the retail plaintiffs Giant Eagle and Burlington plaintiffs.
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     We are ready to proceed.
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              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel.
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              MR. SAWYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              MR. CALES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              MR. NOONA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Stephen
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     Noona on behalf of Merck. We are ready to proceed.
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              MR. OTTINGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Richard
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     Ottinger on behalf of the Glenmark defendants. We are ready
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     to proceed.
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              THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel, as well as all
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     of the other counsel who are present today.
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              We will start the hearing, I'll just make a couple
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of brief remarks, and then we will proceed into some substance. The purpose of our hearing today is to hear evidence to enable the Court to decide whether the *Mylan* case and its result is admissible. That's a very simple statement, but to what point the evidence is admissible pursuant to motion *in limine* number 19, which I'm just going to say is plaintiffs' motion in this case.

Judge Miller did issue a ruling in this matter and,

"Conclude that evidence related to the re-issued Zetia

patent and its assertion against Mylan is relevant to

disputed issues of fact in this case, including plaintiffs'

alternative settlement causation theory and defendants'

defense that the settlement had procompetitive effects."

That's from his memorandum order, which is 2000 at 2.

Judge Miller also found that the *Mylan* evidence, "Poses a serious risk of misleading and confusing the jury." That's in the same place.

Ultimately, Judge Miller ruled that the Mylan evidence was admissible but that the Court would need to carefully scrutinize how it should be used during trial. Again, that is from his opinion.

Subsequent to that, the defendants responded to the Court. The Court issued a notice order. That was notice order number 1. I believe it was issued on April 23rd. I have it here in the packet. But, in any event, it was

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issued, and in that order the Court indicated it would take
this issue under advisement and would give you a ruling
before the evidence was presented, that you would not be
able to mention it in opening statements. So that was what
resulted in this defendants' response to the notice order
restrictions on the discussion of Mylan evidence and
requested this pretrial hearing under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104.
         I would note that if you read 104, basically the
first two reasons for having a Rule 104 evidence hearing are
criminal. They only pertain to a criminal case. There is a
caveat there which says, "Or justice so requires." I'm
going to be asking questions about why "justice so
requires."
         So at this juncture, I want to start the hearing.
Mr. Noona, you can come forward to the podium.
         MR. NOONA: Yes, ma'am.
         THE COURT: Mr. Noona, you are local counsel for
the Merck defendants, and you are the individual who signed
this motion; is that correct?
         MR. NOONA: It is. I am.
         THE COURT: Consequently, the Court holds you
responsible for this motion, as you know. Under our local
rules, the Court at any time, and I say this, and I want
counsel to pay close attention to this statement by the
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Court. If you're not familiar with the rules, you need to go read that rule because that's who the Court looks to, is local counsel. Local counsel is required to sign pleadings, and the Court can hold local counsel responsible for that filing and responsible for any part of the case.

So all the local counsel at any time, on the Court's direction, have to be willing to step in and take over. That means examining witnesses, that means arguing, and I will set the ground rules before trial, but I'm just telling you this in advance. There is going to be notices and warnings if conduct is not under control, and I'll explain it in great detail before we start the trial.

Basically, you get one warning, you get two warnings, and on the third warning, you're at a flagrant one. That flagrant one will then prohibit you from continuing with whatever examination you were doing, and local counsel will take over for that examination or that witness. You can still come back into trial for examination.

After that, there will be warning one, warning two, flagrant two. If you get a flagrant two, then what is going to occur is you may certainly be at trial, you may participate with your counsel, but you may not examine witnesses or cross-examine witnesses or argue, because this is going to be an orderly process. I have looked at the

transcripts, and it's been very disappointing to the Court to see the lack of civility that has occurred at least in pretrial hearings.

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As I've said in my notice order, you will not talk over each other, you will not talk over the Court, and you will not talk over witnesses. There are ways to conduct yourself in a trial, no matter how large it is, no matter how much money is involved, and no matter how zealous you are for your clients.

So I just add that on now, but I wanted to call Mr. Noona up to the podium so I could ask him about this pleading he filed because I've got questions about it.

Do you have it in front of you, Mr. Noona?

MR. NOONA: Your Honor, I'll get it.

THE COURT: This is not directed at you, Mr. Noona. I know that you filed the pleadings and you signed the pleadings, so this is not a statement in any way directed at you either personally or as local counsel for Merck in this matter. This is something directed at both sides.

The Court, in going through these pleadings, has become weary of the misconception of the Court's orders, and this applies equally to both sides. I'm going to go through this, and I'm going to ask you what's the purpose of this statement, because you signed the pleading.

On Page 1, it says, "It will be extremely

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prejudicial to defendants if plaintiffs are allowed to present all of their arguments, both pre- and post-settlement, many of which the Mylan evidence is directly relevant to rebut. While defendants are barred from telling the jury about the Mylan evidence, such a one-sided presentation of the claims and defenses in this case will give plaintiff an unfair advantage right out of the starting gate. "Defendants expect that plaintiffs will tell the jury in their opening statements that prior to the settlement of Glenmark, Merck would have thought its patent was weak and vulnerable to Glenmark's inventorship argument; i.e., the claim that Dr. Afonso should have been named as an inventor on Merck's Ezetimibe patent because Afonso was the first to conceive the operative method used to make compounds 4E and 4F, and it was afraid to go to trial on that issue. Yet, the Court's notice order, defendants cannot respond in their opening by pointing to the fact that Merck actually took issue with Afonso, whether Afonso was the first to conceive the operative method of making compounds 4E and 4F." Now, what leads you to believe and make a statement

Now, what leads you to believe and make a statement that the Court is going to allow the plaintiffs to present evidence post-settlement? The Court's order said no evidence. It said your evidence, opening statements need to

be restricted to the settlement and pre-settlement, no post-settlement evidence. I could point you to ten places, and I will continue to. Why is that implication in a pleading on the record?

MR. NOONA: I think that the plaintiffs' theory is that we settled the case because we thought we had a weak patent and that we paid the generic in order not to have to go forward with that case. That's all pre-settlement -- I mean, pre-Mylan case at the settlement time.

I think the arguments that are made here throughout the lawsuit have been strung together, that they certainly are going to argue that we settled this case in order to avoid losing our patent. There is a dispute over whether there is a consistent argument concerning causation and damages, and there is two different theories for that. We had a whole hearing on that, Your Honor.

But they have never parsed that argument and made the argument that solely based on the information that was in front of the plaintiffs at that exact moment -- or Merck at that moment, did they think it was weak. They have always, and their expert who testified about this, has always said that they settled because they thought the patent was weak and that part of that was an invalidity challenge. The only challenge that was left was this inventorship. And the theory in all of the hearings has

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been that they did that to buy time to fix things. Whether they get into what they did or they didn't, they are still going to make that argument.
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I know Mr. Sobol. He's said this many times in all of the hearings. They are going to say that we settled the case in order to buy off a weak patent.

THE COURT: Excuse me for a minute. I'm not saying he may not ultimately say that. Maybe you did, because you had the patent re-issued. The patent that you settled on is not the patent that you won on.

MR. NOONA: I'm happy to explain that.

THE COURT: No. I don't want that explained. I'm not so much talking about the merits at this point, which we will get into, but the implication that the Court would allow one side to present evidence -- or it's not evidence. That's the whole point of an opening statement. It is not evidence. It is not argument. Opening statements oftentimes are restricted until courts have made rulings.

The implication of this order was that the Court was somehow going to allow plaintiffs' counsel to talk about all of their evidence post-settlement and not the defendants', and I don't know where in the order you come up with that. It's like you're saying, we don't trust the plaintiffs' counsel, they're not going to obey your order. If they didn't, I would call them down without hesitation

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during an opening statement to say, you know the Court's
order does not allow you to go into that in opening
statement. It will be decided at the appropriate time
whether you can use it as evidence.
        MR. NOONA: But with respect, Your Honor, if I
stand in front of the jury as the plaintiff and I say,
"Merck was afraid to go to trial, they were absolutely
afraid to go to trial, and what they did was they bought off
that lawsuit."
         THE COURT: Well, isn't that a good argument?
                    They are going to make that argument.
        MR. NOONA:
         THE COURT:
                    Well, they were afraid to go to trial,
weren't they?
        MR. NOONA: I don't believe so.
         THE COURT: Then why won't you have your Merck
attorneys in here? You're complaining about these
percentages that Dr. Hrubiec has put forward, and yet you
have claimed attorney-client privilege and will not explain.
Who can explain Merck's position better than their
attorneys? You're not waiving your attorney-client. You
want to open the door for all of this evidence that you want
to put in, but you're not willing to put your attorneys on.
So my assessment is, and it may be the jury's assessment is,
that you probably had legal advice. Big companies don't
settle cases without legal advice.
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You all have refused to allow the Merck attorneys at that time to come before this Court, and the jury is what's important. Somebody has got to make this clear to the jury, and this is as clear as mud in some areas. As far as I'm concerned, if you're not willing to have your attorneys come in and say, no, we didn't settle it for that reason. I've read all this. I've been reading the transcripts and keeping up with things. So why?

MR. NOONA: It is my understanding, Your Honor, that Merck made a decision, which is their right, not to waive attorney-client privilege. That causes the issue that you are talking about, but that does not mean that Merck will not come to trial with fulsome evidence that it did not settle this case from an objective point of view because it was afraid of losing its patent.

They have an expert, Mr. Armitage, who will come forward and who will explain in great detail, as he did in his report, that based on several objective facts, that clearly they did not settle this case for fear of losing at a 65 percent chance that Mr. Hrubiec says, that they had a good case, that, in fact, this patent was a patent that was the type of patent that had never been broken on a generic type of challenge.

The re-issue that you mentioned earlier, one thing,
Your Honor --

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THE COURT: That's going to come in, I can tell
      I am not going to allow a jury to be confused and
misled.
         MR. NOONA: Let me tell you something.
         THE COURT: Wait just a minute.
         MR. NOONA: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.
         THE COURT: I won't give you warning one.
         But that is going to come in. You're not going to
stand in here and say, well, we won the Mylan litigation.
There are so many differences, and once you start down that
road and into that rabbit hole, it's all going to come out,
and at some point the Court is going to have to explain the
purpose of the evidence and what exactly occurred, because
what you all did was you went in and got it re-issued.
if you were so convinced that that patent was so good, why
did you get it re-issued before you proceeded with the Mylan
case?
         MR. NOONA: Your Honor, one of the fundamental
problems in this case is having a clear understanding of and
not broad-brushing the re-issue of the patent. When I go
back to the Patent Office, and I ask to re-issue a patent, I
can go in and ask that certain claims be changed, not the
whole patent, and, in fact, what was at issue in Glenmark
was not changed, and very importantly, from a patent
perspective, you cannot get rid of invalidity. You cannot
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expunge the invalidity if it happened in the original
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     patent.
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              That is why, when you look at the decision that
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     Linares made, Judge Linares had to look at both the
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     re-issued patent and the original patent because the
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     inventorship issue is live. The Patent and Trademark Office
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    has to look at it, the Judge has to look at it. You can't
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     just bypass it because you've re-issued the patent.
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              Now, in particular, the issue of inventorship was
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     live in both of these cases, and the issue of whether or not
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    Mr. Afonso was an inventor was at issue in these two cases.
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     Were there other differences? Perhaps. And certainly they
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     did go back into the office and change part of the patent.
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     That was what they do. You have to do that.
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              THE COURT: Excuse me, but I want to say something.
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     First of all, I'm familiar with patent law.
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              MR. NOONA: Yes, ma'am.
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              THE COURT: I have been hearing patent cases for
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     over 30 years, or about 30 years now. Actually, over. I
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     know about patents and getting them re-issued, so I don't
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     need that explained.
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              I can't imagine that that kind of explanation is
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     going to go before a jury in an antitrust case. This is an
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     antitrust case. It's not a patent case. Yes, it revolves
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around certain patents, but this jury is not going to be

diverted by patent law. This is an antitrust case. The patents ultimately were different in the Glenmark case and that settlement and in the *Mylan* case.

That's why patent lawyers do what they do. When they see a weakness, yeah, go in and get it re-issued and get that aspect of it changed. So I think we should end our discussion of patent law because patent law is not going to go before this jury. They are simply going to be told that there are certain procedures that can be taken to change and correct things in patents. That's what patent law is a lot about and Markman hearings.

In any event, I was just concerned, Mr. Noona, by this continuous in here that somehow the Court was going to allow this one-sided presentation. I mean, on Page 4 you've got an argument that said that there was an implication through this whole matter that all of this would go in somehow by plaintiffs, and the Court never said that.

If they even open the door in their opening statements, if I rule in their favor, and I don't know how I'm going to rule, that's why I took it under advisement, if they open that door in their opening statement, the door is opened, and then I'll open it wide up. As soon as you open a door, you can't close it, so you have to be very careful. I'm not saying both, but I have noticed in this, if you are given an inch, you try to open it to a foot. I'm going to

tell you that you open the door, and it just was replete throughout this. Like Page 6, the conclusion, Mr. Noona. I know you signed this. You signed it as local counsel. "The claim is based on post-settlement evidence, and it would be profoundly unfair to allow plaintiffs to make this claim without allowing Merck to explain that despite the re-issue, it, in fact, went to trial in Mylan on the same inventorship claim that was at issue in Glenmark."

That didn't affect the opening statement because I said that neither party could mention all of this. I didn't say that only the defendants were precluded. I just said that no one would issue it, no one would mention it in opening statement, and that includes what's in here.

Finally, and we will end this because I'm not going to hold you to it, I'm not trying to argue with you. I'm just trying to make it clear.

MR. NOONA: Your Honor, I am before you, and I am ready, willing, and able to argue this. I appreciate your comments. Nothing in this paper was meant to suggest that the Court was going to do anything wrong. We were just trying to explain that we didn't want to be in front of a jury and not be able to tell our side of the story.

THE COURT: Well, that would not happen because you said in here if they were allowed to present their evidence during the first week of trial, that would be inherently

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unfair, and if they called any witnesses until I've made a
ruling on this, then they've opened it up, and I'm letting
everybody know that right now. You open the door, and I
will hold you to it. You all are experienced civil
attorneys, and you know the rules, and you know what opening
the door means. So I do have to consider the probative
value of all of this vis-a-vis the confusion to the jury,
and that's an important matter.
         Finally, I would say on Page 7, you say,
"Plaintiffs' claim. By settling the litigation with
Glenmark, Merck believed that it bought itself exclusivity
and eliminated generic competition until December 2016."
Well, that's what this case is about. That's exactly what
the case is about. Then you say that the claim is
demonstrably false, and the jury might not agree with that.
So, I mean, I know that's argument, and I accept that is
argument, and I know that this is an issue, and I know it's
an important issue.
         So I just don't want it to be left that somehow
that the Court opened the door for the plaintiffs and closed
it for the defendants. So I don't understand. I know it's
argument, but I just would tell you that there was some of
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this that was just over-the-top argument, as far as I was

concerned. I know it would have been better to focus on

this as an important issue, and it would help both sides for

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it to be decided before trial, and I'm well aware of that.
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              MR. NOONA: We appreciate the guidance, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          The final thing I would say, and this
     is something we are going to hear about today, but you're
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    making Dr. Hrubiec's testimony of the 65/75 percent chance
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     of winning, that patent counsel would have advised Merck.
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              Well, you can rebut that simply by bringing on your
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     attorneys. What did they advise? You can waive an
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     attorney-client privilege. So that's something that you can
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     waive, and you don't waive it, and that raises red flags.
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     I'm just telling you, I don't know how that's going to be
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     handled, but you're supposed to present the best evidence on
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     an issue. So the best evidence, in my opinion, would be
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     whoever was advising at that time, but I'm not there yet.
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              MR. NOONA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Noona, I thank you.
                                                   I know how
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     diligent you are, and I appreciate your rising to the
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     occasion.
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              MR. NOONA: I am more than happy, always to stand
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     up, maybe not as prepared as you would have liked me to be,
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     but I do check and read everything that I sign, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: I know you do, and I don't doubt the
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     competence of any of the local counsel nor any competence of
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     counsel. It's local counsel that I look to.
              MR. NOONA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Thank you.
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              I'm going to call upon plaintiffs to argue their
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     position first since it's their motion in limine.
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              Mr. Sobol, I understand you are going to argue.
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     Mr. Sobol?
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              MR. SOBOL: Yes.
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              THE COURT: You are going to argue that?
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              MR. SOBOL: Yes, Your Honor. Good afternoon.
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     it please the Court. Tom Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol
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     Shapiro, for the direct purchasers and arguing for all the
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     plaintiffs.
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              What I would like to first do, Your Honor, is we
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     have some handouts, and if I could approach to have those
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     handed up, please.
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              Have to get it to the important person.
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              THE COURT: Were you a law clerk at one point, Mr.
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     Sobol?
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              MR. SOBOL: I was, Your Honor, to the former Chief
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     Justice Allan Hale in his retirement year up in
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     Massachusetts.
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              THE COURT: So you, like all other law clerks,
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     thought you knew more than the judge?
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              MR. SOBOL: I was one of the rare exceptions. He
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     was quite something. But I learned an awful lot. I hope
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     that your clerk learns as much as I learned in my year.
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So, Your Honor, first I just want to put in context what the arguable relevance is of the *Mylan* patent merits to the case so that we know what the legal issue is under which these factual issues are being addressed.

If I understand it, there are two possible legal hooks, if you will, under which the probabilities of the Mylan litigation are arguably relevant. One is assessing the anticompetitive effects of the reverse payoff, reverse payment in exchange for the avoidance of a competitively balanced agreed entry date. That's one of their relevance issues. But, however, when we are looking at the anticompetitive effects of any agreement, we evaluate it at the time of the agreement.

This is stated in our briefs, but if you go to our slide 3, please, you will see that -- and these are cases that were cited in Judge Miller and I think in some of your rulings in this case. But the competitive effects of an agreement or of a challenged restraint are assessed at the time that the agreement is entered into.

Then if you go to the next slide, which is slide 4, these cases on slide 4 and slide 5 also indicate that what you do when you are looking at an anticompetitive restraint, here, again, the anticompetitive restraint being a reverse payment to avoid the potential for earlier risk under a competitively balanced agreed entry date, avoiding that risk

is you assess it at the time of the agreement. Why does that make sense? Because we are trying to hold antitrust, potential antitrust wrongdoers accountable for their actions at the time of their agreement rather than letting them have it be assessed later on down the road to determine whether or not what kind of effects it ended up having. That's at least how you look at the violation issue.

In this case, if I understand it correctly, the Mylan case, the Mylan situation is only relevant, if it's relevant at all -- and the plaintiffs don't think it is -- the Mylan situation is only relevant to the agreement to the extent that the victory in the Mylan case would have allowed Glenmark onto the market earlier. That's the only way that it ends up being relevant. But our position on that is, that's talking about why the acceleration clauses in the agreement are procompetitive. It is not explaining why you've done a reverse payment to avoid an earlier entry date.

The second legal reason, and probably far more germane to this case, is that when looking at and trying to determine a competitively balanced agreed entry date, I think Your Honor can see that I'm using the language from your summary judgment decision, which I thought it was, frankly, very precise in trying to define the kind of risks that was avoided, allegedly avoided in this case. So a

competitively balanced agreed entry date is determined by the facts as existed at the time of the agreement, May 2010.

And one looks to -- one would have expected that Glenmark and Merck's lawyers, although they haven't testified, would have looked at the facts that had been developed during the course of that two-year or three-year litigation to be able to assess where they were going to go at that point in time.

The defendants then say, well, we would like to look at what the result was in Mylan two years later as predictive of what people would have known in May of 2010. Obviously, our first position on that is that can't be the case. No one knew in May of 2010, at the time that Glenmark and Merck settled that case, what would happen in the Merck versus Mylan case. You could not know what was going to happen then. You make predictions in May of 2010, like a forecaster forecasts the weather in May of 2010, and the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of your forecast in May of 2010 is based upon the facts and circumstances and the science, or here the law, as it existed at that time, and you are held accountable for the reasonableness of that forecast. It can't be the case that you look at something that happened much later on down the road.

Now, assuming then that a Court were to entertain then. Well, okay, but we are still going to look at what

happened with the *Mylan* case, because it turns out that the forecast was only 30 percent rain, but it did rain, you know, later on down the road, so now we're going to look at the fact that it rained, and now you're going to try to figure out was the forecast wrong or not, even though the forecast was probably solid at the time.

So what happened after Glenmark settled? And I'll do this as very quickly and as in a summary fashion as I can. Four weeks after Glenmark settled, the chief person at Schering, Merck's company they bought, the chief patent person at Schering swore under oath to the patent office that the '721 patent was invalid in whole or in part by reason of that fact that that patent claimed more than the patentee was entitled to, swore to that under oath unequivocally.

Now, there are other parts of the submission that was made that day four weeks after the Glenmark case settled, when seeking the re-issue, where the patentee, where Merck tried to waffle or hedge its bets by saying, well, allegedly this was said or we might have done that, but the oath was unequivocal, our patent, in whole or in part, is invalid.

Subsequently, when the patent office re-issued that patent under the re-issue statute, the patent office, as a matter of law, had to also have concluded that the '721

patent was invalid, in whole or in part, in order to allow re-issue. And then once Merck was willing to surrender, which is required under the law under '721 -- under the patent re-issue statute, they had to surrender the '721 and get a brand-new patent.

Now, we don't know why Merck sought re-issue. They haven't put witnesses up to testify about why. So we can only have what objectively one would reasonably infer.

What's the first thing one would reasonably infer? You're trying to improve your chances. You're trying to improve your patent. There can't be any other explanation for it. You have left in the patent, that's now being re-issued, bullet claims to Ezetimibe, the active ingredient of Zetia, and the only explanation that has to be that you went through this process of re-issue, which was in no way guaranteed, and brushed it so clearly, right in the aftermath of Glenmark, to be able to improve your chances.

Now, why is that even relevant, in part, to this motion is this. There is no one who can be able to educate the jury about what -- how much those chances were improved by the re-issue. How would the jury even begin to understand that on this rabbit hole or this sideshow, and none of even the experts for either side have said, well, a re-issue, when you do this under the circumstances, it increases your chances X amount. So even though Mylan won

in the end, you've got to discount that by X amount, because nobody knows. But, in any event, they re-issued it.

Then what's the next thing that they do? So when Merck was before the *Mylan* -- in the Glenmark case, excuse me, Merck took the position that a gentleman by the name of Mr. Rosenblum had conceived of these two compounds, 4E and 4F. That was their position. They had him -- that he was the one who had conceived it.

In that case, in Glenmark also, Mr. Rosenblum said that he had a method by which he could make these two compounds, and there was a dispute as to whether he could make this, these two compounds. So Merck also had another gentleman, a man by the name of Mr. Brisbois, a scientist, who came in and said, I looked at Mr. Rosenblum's method, and I can recreate it, and that was their position in Glenmark.

After getting the re-issue, Merck, in their findings of fact, and we have this in the slides, changed their position, and they said, no, the earlier inventors of these beta-lactam compounds, and Mr. Burnett and then Mr. Clader, they conceived of these two compounds. They, in the course of their more fundamental research and prior patents, they are the ones who came up with these two compounds, and not only that, but it was they who had the ways to make these two compounds.

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And Merck even pointed out to the Court in the Mylan case that Mr. Rosenblum, and this other gentleman, Mr. Afonso, but Mr. Rosenblum hadn't even gotten onto the project until Mr. Burnett and Mr. Clader had conceived of these two compounds and hadn't disclosed methods to make them. So it was different as to who made the key compounds that were being disputed. It changes.

Again, now, how is that going to be explained to our antitrust jury about that kind of a difference, about what happens when you change your theory about who made the compounds? But another difference is this. In the Glenmark case, Glenmark was pursuing three different challenges to the patent. In Mylan, Mylan only chose one. How do we balance those?

In the Glenmark case, Glenmark was only saying that this gentleman thought he was the inventor, Mr. Afonso. They were only saying Mr. Afonso made compounds 4E and 4F, he was the inventor of 4E and 4F.

But in the *Mylan* case, *Mylan* decided to say that Afonso, not only did he make 4E and 4F, he also made Ezetimibe. He was an inventor of Ezetimibe itself, the fundamental difference.

So, and then there is one other thing, too, the kind of thing that would be presented to the jury.

THE COURT: You are talking about now in your case

in chief?

MR. SOBOL: Well, if this comes up, if the defendants are entitled to say, we are going to put on the Mylan results, right, in our case, then I think it's appropriate for me to start out at the gate and say, well, I'm not going to let the jury to think that we are hiding from this issue. I want to be able to put on my own evidence directly to say, you know why Glenmark was a weak case? Because now I'm going to show you why they did all this stuff, you know, colloquially, but they did all these things in a later case in order to improve their chances, that from which you, jury, you can infer that they must have had a weak case to begin with.

I don't want to have to be going down any of this. I do think the whole thing is a distraction, but my point is it's like your allusion to a door, Your Honor. If the Mylan result door gets opened, it gets opened all the way, and then the plaintiffs take the position that we are going to thrust all of this in front of the jury because we want to show the jury not that this case inevitably would have lost but that they were doing things to clean up their act.

THE COURT: Well, if you were so concerned with the admissibility of the *Mylan* evidence at trial, why did you not bring it up at summary judgment or an earlier time, and you waited until the 11th hour to file the motion *in limine*?

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MR. SOBOL: So it was not clear to us early on what
our position should be with respect to this evidence at all.
And what we thought was more important was to fight each
fight as it came along, meaning there were two times that it
came up: One was at Daubert against Dr. Hrubiec, Robert
Hrubiec, and the other time was at summary judgment.
         We indicated that we didn't think it was relevant,
but, you're right, our primary argument was it does not get
rid of the case as a whole, and we thought that that was the
appropriate way to proceed. And when it did come time to
file our motions in limine, these were timely filed months
ago.
         THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question.
your position that all this Mylan evidence should be
excluded or just which post-dates the Merck-Glenmark?
         MR. SOBOL: Just what post-dates the Merck-Glenmark
settlement, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Okay. Do you propose any type of a
limiting instruction being given to the jury about all of
the post-settlement evidence? Have you come up with
anything? Because, certainly, we are not going to
re-litigate the Mylan case here.
         MR. SOBOL: Right. So if I understand what the
Court is asking, our position with respect to the
post-Merck-Glenmark settlement Mylan evidence is that all of
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that should come out, and if all that evidence comes out, I'm not aware of something that would end up being before the jury for which we would have to give them a limiting instruction.

Now, I do want to -- just so that I'm completely transparent -- I want to be clear, there are other kinds of things that happened in this case, not about *Mylan*. There are other things that happened in this case after the settlement, obviously, which would be coming in, but that doesn't have anything to do with *Mylan*.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm saying this basically to both parties, if it comes in, I'm talking about the post-settlement, it's got to be, if the Court let's it in, some type of a limiting instruction or something that would have to go to the jury to put into context why this evidence in another case in another patent is coming in before them.

I'll mention some things later at the conclusion of the hearing, a couple of suggestions I have, but in any event, I just wanted you all to be thinking of, if the evidence does come in, some type of limiting instruction.

Go ahead. I basically just wanted to mention those while you were talking about it. It sounds like all the Mylan evidence, and I don't know why you all can't agree about some stipulation that, okay, we all know that the

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patent was changed. I don't understand. Both sides, and
I'm going to mention this in the end, are inviting error.
As far as I'm concerned, if it is let in, that you would be
wise to come up with some kind of stipulation or agreement.
I mean, there are certain things, facts are facts, and the
fact is you went in and you got the patent re-issued.
fact is, you can maybe talk about the similarities, but
ultimately you are talking about different patents,
different cases. I mean, there are certain things that are
fact that could be in a stipulation that would reduce the
confusion to the jury.
         MR. SOBOL: Sure.
         THE COURT: Anyway, you were giving me such a
history of the Mylan litigation, and I read a lot about it.
I certainly hope all of that wouldn't come in for a jury.
Wouldn't propose for the whole scenario of what occurred
from the Glenmark settlement to the conclusion of the Mylan
litigation, but go ahead.
                    Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, so I think
a large part of our position, our point in terms of that,
going through the whole background, is that -- and I've made
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my way about halfway, maybe a little bit more than halfway

through the differences between the Glenmark case and the

Mylan case, is that in order for the jury, if the jury gets

any suggestion that the Mylan case prevailed, they will need

to have before them evidence about each of these various changes and when they happened, and they won't be told why the defendant did it, but they would have to make estimates about why they did it, and our point then is you end up in this situation where you are just so far down the road that you end up in a truly situation where you're very much confusing the jury.

I'll move on with the argument. So in the Glenmark case, you recall that I indicated that the Merck position there was that this Mr. Rosenblum had been the inventor. He had tried to make the compounds 4E and 4F. There was a dispute whether he could. And then Merck came up with a scientist by the name of Mr. Brisbois who said that he could do and tried to do it. Then there was a dispute about whether he could do it.

That same evidence was also presented in the *Mylan* case. We have a similarity there. However, when the *Mylan* court in New Jersey made its decision, it observed that this Brisbois, this Mr. Brisbois had testified but did not rely upon that evidence at all in its decision.

So you have the reality that the *Mylan* court actually rejected one of the arguments that had been made in Glenmark, adding some more confusion to more differences.

Well, we also know about what the Mylan court did,

was that the *Mylan* court said, you know, regarding this 4E and 4F, I agree with you, Merck, on your new position as to who conceived it. It's Mr. Burnett and Mr. Clader, right, and that's who they said who had first conceived it, and they said that those gentlemen had had methods that were in place before. So you have all of these various differences between the two cases that would end up with very significant juror confusion.

There is another issue that overlaps this, and this deals with a little bit, I think, Your Honor, of -- let me take a step back. I have given a lot of thought also to Judge Miller's decision on this issue and how would a court go about trying to police appropriately, you know, shifting sands on what it is that people do here with respect to this.

There are some subsidiary facts. I'm not sure if the parties could agree with what they are with the stipulations, and, you're right, frankly, we have not been very successful in reaching an awful lot of stipulations of fact in this case, but what I will say is this. There are many issues also of characterizations of patent law, patent principles, and characterizations like it's the same patent. Well, it's not the same patent. They are saying it's the same law, but it's not the same law as it was in Therasense.

They say it was the same issue of inventorship, but

that's misleading because it is not really the same issue of inventorship if you are saying in one case the one group conceived of it, and then you're saying in the other case somebody else conceived of it, it's not the same issue.

And if you tell the jury, well, it's the same issue of inventorship, you have an expert who is -- their expert is as adamant and 100 percent characteristic about these issues as counsel's advocacy about it's the same this, it's the same that. Now the plaintiffs are in the position of saying, well, it's not really the same way, it's not the same way this. And, frankly, at some point, the plaintiffs would call upon the Court, with all respect, to say, well, wait a second, Your Honor, they're mischaracterizing an issue of law. And this Court knows -- or we would advocate -- because I'm not going to suggest what the Court knows, but advocate that this Court can't let either the counsel or their witness mischaracterize comparison of these two cases if it is incorrect as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you in my opinion it's not the same patent. Now, how you qualify that, I'm not speaking to that, but it is not the same. Ultimately, it is not the same patent. I know it, and all of you all know it. So that would have to be qualified for the jury that it was changed. It's not the same patent as at the time the Glenmark settlement went forward, which has

resulted in all of this antitrust litigation.

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agreement.

2 Excuse me for a minute. 3 Go ahead. MR. SOBOL: Finally, Your Honor, I want to end up 4 5 on another point of law. If you can turn to our slide 29, 6 please. 7 This issue, as you can imagine, Your Honor, in some 8 of these reverse payment cases, this issue or issues like 9 this arise from time to time. In our briefing, we have 10 cited this case. We also replicate it here. In the Namenda 11 court, there was a similar kind of issue that arose 12 regarding a confidential memorandum, and Judge McMahon was 13 of the opinion to exclude that evidence because it did not 14 come to light to the parties until after they settled the

Also, in the Apotex case, our slide 31, we think that Judge Goldberg did a very good way of navigating these waters. In that case what Judge Goldberg did was realized that a later invalidation of the patent would be unduly prejudicial to the defendants, even though the defendants' patent was found to be procured by inequitable conduct. On

Paragraph 4 litigation. And so, again, you have this issue

parties settle, then it ought not be influencing the jury's

where if you've got things that are cropping up after the

analysis in terms of assessing the anticompetitive

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the issue of violation, he said as a matter of law it should not come in, so he bifurcated this trial and made sure it did not come in that for that reason.
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THE COURT: As an aside, so you all know, I have not only reviewed the *Apotex* opinion, but I've read all the jury instructions.

MR. SOBOL: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: I have reviewed all of the jury instructions in Apotex, and I would also tell you that I'm aware that the Mylan litigation was a bench trial and not a jury trial. Jury trials are somewhat different from the standpoint that the judge is charged with knowing the law in a bench trial and sorting through the evidence. In a jury trial, you all have to educate that jury as to the facts that will then lead to the instructions of law from the Court.

You all have a tremendous duty. It's not up to the Court to straighten this all out for the jury. It's up to you all. I'm not going to give any legal instructions upon which you have not offered sufficient evidence to support the jury instruction. So I've reviewed the Apotex instructions, and they were very good.

MR. SOBOL: I won't make any further remarks, then.

I do think that Judge Goldberg navigated that quite well.

He did find that for the causation theory that was involved

in that case to allow in some later patent evidence, but this Court has already read those decisions so I don't need to tell you about it.

What I will say, this is my final remark with respect to this motion, if I may, Your Honor, is this. This Court and these lawyers, for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, we all have legal education, we all have experience in the law, we all have some background in patent issues, and we can ourselves try to parse these issues apart even in this antitrust case.

The plaintiffs' position is that given the fact that this is something that happened two years after the fact, and given the numerosity of the issues and how different it is, it's completely well within your discretion, under 403, and we would seek the Court to exercise it, and we do not think it would be error in you exercising your discretion under Rule 403 to say, you know what, this is just too much to expect the jury to do. It would be unduly prejudicial, far too confusing for the jury. It would weigh your trial down because it is going to require massive amounts of more testimony from witnesses, documents, as you can see, because all of the things, the differences I've indicated here obviously would have to be paraded before the jury, and counsel fighting and struggling to be able to have the jury in what I would suggest would be

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a hopelessly confused mess of trying to figure out why we've
got literally a trial within a trial within a trial, because
we are supposed to be trying an antitrust case, and then we
will look a little bit at the merits of the Glenmark case,
in terms of looking at what the possibilities were of
Glenmark winning, but then we also, inside that second
trial, are now having a third trial, which is the trial of
the Mylan case, and we are not even trying the Mylan case.
         Now we are putting the jury in a situation where
they are trying to compare two cases. I just think it is
too much, Your Honor. Thank you.
         THE COURT:
                    Thank you, Mr. Sobol.
         Who is arguing for Merck?
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Your Honor, Sam Liversidge for the
Merck defendants.
         THE COURT: You are arguing it, not Mr. Ismail?
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Correct, Your Honor. I have some
slides as well, if I can hand those up.
         THE COURT: Certainly.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Your Honor, good afternoon.
Liversidge on behalf of the Merck defendants and arguing for
the defendants here today.
         We appreciate the Court's time on this issue.
is obviously an important issue for us. We appreciate the
opportunity to explain some of the background here and some
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of the background around the evidence on the Mylan case.

I'd like to, if I could, just walk you through quickly plaintiffs' basic claim on the inventorship issue in the case because I think it helps the Court understand how this evidence fits in.

If we can go to slide 3, I know you have already seen this probably many times. This is the basic opinion that Dr. Hrubiec is offering, which is that Merck was highly likely to lose the case, and Glenmark was highly likely to win. This is the foundational opinion for their case, and this is used as a proxy for what Merck was thinking at the time of the settlement. So they take an expert opinion after the fact and use it as a proxy for what we would have been thinking and expecting at the time of the settlement.

We go to slide 4, the entire basis for that opinion is the inventorship claim, the improper inventorship challenge, and they chose to make that the claim that forms the basis of the 65 to 75 percent opinion that Dr. Hrubiec is offering, of course, knowing that we went to trial on the inventorship issue in the *Mylan* case.

And if I can go to slide 5, just so that the Court understands because I'm not sure this has been briefed at length, the inventorship claim in the Glenmark case was that in the patent application, the original patent application, Merck named five scientists as inventors. It named five.

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And the claim was you failed to name a sixth inventor, Dr. Afonso. That was the basic claim in the Glenmark case, and that was the basic claim in the Mylan case; you should have named Dr. Afonso.
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THE COURT: That issue then predates the settlement, so that would not be improper because that issue then would predate the settlement; is that correct?

MR. LIVERSIDGE: That would predate the settlement. All of the facts around these inventorship issues took place in the 1990s, actually in the early '90s, so long before the Glenmark case and the *Mylan* case.

THE COURT: But you can do a stipulation on something like that. You don't need to present all this evidence to the jury about inventorship patents. Just come to an agreement and stipulate it to the jury. I mean, the jury is just going to be confused by, you've got Stuart Rosenblum, you've got Sundeep Dugar, you have got Duane A. Burnett, you've got John W. Clader, you've got Brian A. McKittrick, you've got Dr. Afonso, and just come to some agreement over what the jury should know that was the issue in the Glenmark case.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not telling you you have to, but
I'm saying from my way of thinking that's the way you would
do something like that as opposed to spending your valuable

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trial time and trying to educate a jury that probably you're
not going to have anybody on that jury that knows anything,
probably, I don't know. I don't know who the jury panel
even is, but I doubt you're going to have an antitrust
expert. If you do, you all will have stricken the person.
You're not going to have a patent expert on there or an
attorney. You will have that information, so the odds are
you're not going to have that kind of person on the jury.
         I think all of this is just so much for a jury to
absorb, but go ahead.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you, Your Honor.
         If we look at slide 6, speaking of the Glenmark
case, on slide 6 we see a description of what the
inventorship claim was in Glenmark, and this is
Dr. Hrubiec's testimony. The claim in Glenmark was that Dr.
Afonso should have been named an inventor on the '721 patent
because he possessed the operative method of making the
claimed compounds 4E and 4F. That was the inventorship
claim in Glenmark. He should have been named an inventor
because he came up with a way to make these compounds 4E and
4F.
         If we go to slide 7, that is the issue that Judge
Linares decided in the Mylan case. Judge Linares determined
that Afonso did not contribute to the operative method of
making compounds 4E and 4F and that Afonso was not an
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inventor of the compounds 4E and 4F.
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              Dr. Hrubiec's 65 to 75 percent opinion is premised
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     on the chances that Glenmark or Merck was going to win on
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     this issue.
              THE COURT: But you didn't know at the time.
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: We didn't know. But Judge
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     Linares' opinion is another opinion about how a reasonable
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     and competent patent lawyer would view these issues, and he
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     reached a very different conclusion than Dr. Hrubiec.
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              THE COURT: Why don't you just tell us? You've got
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     the reasonable and competent patent lawyers that were
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     involved in this. So why don't you just get up and tell
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     them? Why don't you just tell them to tell the story, if
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     the story is compelling? You've got those attorneys or
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     you've got those records, and you're claiming
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     attorney-client privilege. Mr. Hrubiec is an attorney,
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     isn't he, patent attorney?
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: He is.
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              THE COURT: So what else are you going to do?
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     other words, you've got the key to the evidence. You were
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     in the case. They had legal advice. They had your
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     attorneys, so you hold the key to it.
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Those attorneys are going to
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     testify, Your Honor, and they are going to testify to all of
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     the objective facts in the case that we believe show why we
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would have won the Glenmark case.
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              THE COURT: The attorneys that were in the Mylan
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     case?
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: The attorneys from Merck that were
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     involved in Mylan and in Glenmark, they are going to
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     testify.
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              THE COURT: Who are they?
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Paul Matukaitis is one.
              THE COURT: Can you spell the last name?
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: I think so. M-a-t-u-k-a-i-t-i-s.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: I think I got that right.
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     then Lisa Jakob is the other one, J-a-k-o-b. Those two
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     attorneys are going to testify.
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              THE COURT: What cases were they involved in?
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: They were both involved in the
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     Glenmark case and the Mylan case.
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              THE COURT: They represented Merck?
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Correct.
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              THE COURT: I've seen Ms. Jakob's name, but has the
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     other name been in anything? Maybe he just hasn't been in
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     something that I read.
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              MR. LIVERSIDGE: The other name was in the briefing
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     on summary judgment because he was involved in negotiating
     the settlement, Mr. Matukaitis. Ms. Jakob was the lead
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attorney overseeing the day-to-day litigations, and she is scheduled to testify the first week of trial, perhaps it's the beginning of the second week. The plaintiffs told us they intended to call her on Thursday.
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THE COURT: You are talking about the plaintiffs presenting this person?

MR. LIVERSIDGE: They are calling our witness in their case. They are calling Ms. Jakob in their case.

THE COURT: We will see if they open the door. Go ahead.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Your Honor, I'm giving you this background on the claim, and I guess let me just skip ahead on the slides. I've got a number to cover.

Judge Linares resolved the inventorship, the underlying inventorship that was also in play in the Glenmark case, it's that Dr. Hrubiec intends to make findings based on the evidence and tell the jury that it is his opinion that a reasonable and competent lawyer would have reached the following conclusions about the evidence when a lot of the things he's saying, a lot of the opinions he has are directly contrary to the opinions of Judge Linares. They are more specific findings than just the patent was upheld as valid and enforceable.

THE COURT: I'm not going to let you put in a

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judge's, that's highly prejudicial to tell a jury that a
federal judge found this in another case, and they haven't
heard that case. I haven't heard that case. I certainly
haven't read all of the transcripts for it. So that would
be so prejudicial as to tell a jury, by the way, that's like
saying this is the law of this case. The judge determines
the law of this case.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: We certainly are not proposing to
have it presented as the law of the case, Your Honor. But
Dr. Hrubiec intends to say things like, reaching the
conclusion that Dr. Afonso was the first scientist who had
an operative method of making compounds 4E and 4F, when
Judge Linares determined that Dr. Afonso did not first
conceive of the operative method of making these compounds.
         THE COURT: I'm not going to be bound by Judge
Linares. He is a fine judge, but one Court is not going to
be bound by the findings of a judge on something like that
that involved all of these different facts and a change in
the patent, a re-issue of the patent. You've got a re-issue
of the patent, and that is something that you cannot get
around.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE:
                         Okay. Well, Your Honor, we are
not talking about being bound as much as it is an opinion of
another reasonable and competent lawyer.
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THE COURT: He is not a lawyer. Judge Linares is

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no longer a lawyer. Judges can't practice law. They are no
longer lawyers. I have no idea what his background was in
the practice of law. Just simply not going to allow it.
You can count on that right now, that I'm not going to let
that come in, and I would call down the attorney, strike the
evidence, and instruct the jury that it was improper
evidence, contrary to the Court's rulings, and they are not
to be bound by it, they are to totally ignore that evidence
in deciding the issues proposed in the case. You're not
going to issue another judge's opinion in this case.
        MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood.
         THE COURT: A finding like that. You are just not
going to do that. I hope you weren't planning it.
        MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood, Your Honor.
        Let me skip to the re-issue since we spent time on
that. If we go to slide 16, and Mr. Noona mentioned this
point. One of the reasons why we don't think the re-issue
changed the inventorship challenge here is because you can't
undo a claim for inequitable conduct by re-issuing the
patent, and that's why it was necessary for Judge Linares to
rule on the claim that Dr. Afonso contributed to the methods
of making 4E and 4F, even though the plaintiffs say those
compounds were dropped. And that's why it was necessary for
him to determine whether Dr. Afonso was an inventor on the
patents that were at issue in Glenmark even though the
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patent had been re-issued and changed.

So if I skip to my next slide, the very basic slide, slide 17, these are the Zetia patents. The Court has probably seen this, but the original patent was the '115 patent issued back in 1998. That patent then got re-issued, and in 2002 it became the '721. And the '115 and the '721 patents were the patents that were at issue in the Glenmark case. Those were the patents at issue in that case.

Then before the *Mylan* trial, the patent got re-issued and became the '461. But the claim about inventorship is that Dr. Afonso should have been named an inventor on the original patent, the '115. Dr. Afonso was gone from the company for almost a decade before the re-issue patent became the '461.

The question was should he have been named an inventor on that original patent, the '115? And that's why when you go to slide 18, you see that this is the testimony of Dr. Hrubiec. You understand that Judge Linares made a finding that Dr. Afonso was not a co-inventor of the '115 and its subsequent '721 patents.

Those are the same patents that were at issue in the Glenmark case because he had to make that determination to resolve the inventorship challenge. The patent did change in the re-issue. We are not contesting that. We acknowledge that there were some changes in the patent.

```
Well, enter into a stipulation, then.
 1
              THE COURT:
 2
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood, Your Honor.
 3
                          That's the way I would see resolving
              THE COURT:
 4
     this, is that there was a court finding that he was not a
 5
     co-inventor, and something like that, whatever you all can
 6
     agree. I'd have to look at it, but enter into a
 7
     stipulation. There are certain things that are facts here,
 8
     and you can enter into a stipulation.
 9
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: We can propose a stipulation that
10
     has the findings like you see here on slide 18. He made a
11
     finding that Dr. Afonso was not a co-inventor of the '115
12
     and '721 patents, and Dr. Hrubiec agrees with that.
13
              THE COURT: You don't have to say Judge Linares.
14
     You can say a finding was made in such litigation. You
15
     don't have to refer to the judge. A finding was made in the
16
     Mylan litigation and when it was made. As a result of that
17
     finding, you all would have to write the stipulation, but
18
     you can say a finding was made in a case without saying a
19
     judge. It's one thing to argue that to a judge. In other
20
     words, a lot of times somebody will come into your court and
21
     say, Judge Davis did so and so, or the Fourth Circuit with
22
     Chief Judge Gregory writing the opinion did. That's
23
    permissible before a Court. But the prejudicial value of
24
     that, when a judge is sitting in a federal courtroom with a
25
     federal jury, it gives it some inherent status that it
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shouldn't have in another case.

Anyway, there are ways to get around it. You can say "in that case," and I would certainly consider that as a stipulation from the parties without saying Judge Linares.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Certainly. We will undertake the initiative to prepare a proposed stipulation on those facts and those rulings in *Mylan*.

THE COURT: I think that was one of the words of advice I was going to give to both parties at the end of this, that maybe a little bit of time you all have left might be well spent trying to reach some resolution on this stipulation that would resolve, if not all of it, at least part of it. Go ahead.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you. Your Honor, if I could, I spent a little bit of time talking about the likelihood of success opinion and why we think this evidence is relevant. I just want to mention a couple of other areas where we think this evidence comes into play in an important way in the case.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: If I can move to slide 32. I have a lot of slides. It's not just Dr. Hrubiec that we need to cross-examine with this evidence. We are dealing with economist models that they are presenting in the case that drive the alternative entry dates and the damages in the

case, and they make a number of fundamental assumptions in those models that drive damages and that drive the alternative entry dates, and some of them bring into play in a significant way the *Mylan* evidence and the *Mylan* case.

For example, this is Dr. McGuire, the chief economist that the direct purchasers are going to bring, and he has an economic model that he is going to present, and he assumes in that model that when Merck settled the case with Glenmark, when it settled the case, that it expected that it was going to maintain exclusivity all the way to December of 2016. That's a fundamental assumption in his model, and you can see his deposition testimony here.

In other words, Merck thought it was buying itself exclusivity all the way to December of 2016, and they valued the settlement to Merck based on that assumption. They say that the settlement was worth \$2.8 billion to Merck because Merck thought, when it settled with Glenmark, it was going to have exclusivity without any generic competition all the way to December of 2016.

But, of course, Merck had to win the Mylan case in order for that to be true. If Merck lost the Mylan case, not only was Mylan going to be able to enter the market but Glenmark was going to be able to enter as well, and so this is not a correct assumption. You cannot assume, based on the settlement, that Merck was going to maintain

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exclusivity. That only happens if Merck wins the Mylan case, because this was the Ezetimibe patent that was at issue in Mylan, and it's undisputed that if Merck lost that case, Glenmark was going to come in.
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We can see the testimony on slide 34 from Dr. McGuire. "Do you understand that Glenmark would have been entitled to enter the market with its generic version of Zetia if *Mylan* had prevailed in its litigation against Merck and invalidated Merck's patent covering Zetia?"

"That's my understanding."

So they are going to go in front of the jury and assume we had zero risk of having generic competition between the time of the settlement and December of 2016. We have to be able to counter that by pointing out that we actually went to trial in the *Mylan* case on the Ezetimibe patent. Whatever you want to say about the differences in the patent, it was the patent covering Ezetimibe, it would have allowed Glenmark to enter the market.

How does Dr. McGuire deal with this issue of the Mylan litigation? On slide 33, we can see. "How did they know there was not going to be any generic entry after the settlement with Glenmark?"

"Answer: Because they had an entry date of December 12, 2016."

"And they had ongoing litigation with other

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generics, including Mylan, on the same patent, right?"
         "That's true. They must have thought they had a
very high chance of success."
         "Okav.
         "In the Mylan litigation."
         THE COURT: But isn't that what settlement is all
about? You roll the dice? In other words, settlement,
whenever parties settle, there is not certainty. You settle
based upon your assessment, whether you're in an antitrust
case, a patent case, a slip and fall case. You settle a
case, you settle it based upon your assessment of the
strength of your case and the weaknesses of your case at the
time. You can't control what happens after the settlement.
         Yes, a post-settlement might then, in hindsight, it
is like looking back at something you've done. You
certainly wish you could change it, but you can't. You
don't get do-overs. So the problem here is that you settle
it, and that something that happens in the future occurs,
you don't know that at the time you're settling it. That is
what settlement is all about, and I quess you call it
hornbook law in law school where you can't talk about
certain issues of settlement in cases.
         You can look at the reverse. You can't talk about
certain issues after a case had settled. But, in any event,
that's what settlement is. All of us as lawyers knew it,
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you as lawyers know it, and that's why you settle. Things may not go in your favor.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood, Your Honor.

This is more a point about countering the fundamental assumptions that their experts are making in order to value the settlement. If we look at slide 35, we see that as of the time of the settlement, they are saying, when you settled with Glenmark, you had no threat of exclusivity, zero risk to you until December of 2016, and that's how they valued the settlement. And we want to be able to point out to this expert, the only reason that's true is because we actually went to trial against Mylan and won it. If we'd lost, there would have been generic competition years earlier. It is after the settlement evidence, but it is fundamental to countering an assumption that they are using to come up with their damage estimates.

It's also the case that they have these contradictory assumptions that do not hold together. If we look at slide 36, they're basically saying that we thought we had a hundred percent chance of winning *Mylan* but only 25 to 35 percent chance of winning Glenmark.

THE COURT: They are going to say that because you got your patent changed or you got it re-issued. That would be my immediate reaction without having heard the testimony.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: I think you are correct. I think

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they are going to say that. But it's also the case that if we had lost that case, that there would have been generic competition, including from Glenmark. We think it's important for us to be able to raise that issue to counter these assumptions.

I would point out on the same subject, if we go to slide 41.

THE COURT: I think that's motion in limine number 15 that Judge Miller just ruled on. I don't think that this hearing was scheduled for that, and, in fact, if I were you, and I was looking at my time, I might not spend a lot of time between now and the trial on that. I thought, to both sides, I thought it was a very good opinion. I wouldn't spend a lot of time on it between now and trial. But if you want to use your time today talking about it, you can.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: I'll just make one final point on this, Your Honor. If we look at slide 41, it is the case that this settlement agreement had an acceleration clause, which we believe is one of the procompetitive aspects of the settlement. It gave an entry date of December 12th, 2016, or an earlier date if Merck's patent is invalidated.

So if Mylan had won that litigation against Merck under the terms of the settlement between Merck and Glenmark, Glenmark would have been able to enter the market pursuant to the terms of the agreement. And so you cannot

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arrive at the entry date under the terms of the settlement
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 2
     agreement at issue without understanding whether Merck won
 3
     the Mylan litigation or not.
              So we think it's going to be important to explain
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 5
     at some level to the jury that we did have another
 6
     litigation. If we'd lost that litigation, Glenmark would
 7
     have been able to enter even earlier than they did, and the
 8
     only reason they didn't is because we went to trial and won
 9
     against them. So we think this is another area where it's
10
     important that we be able to tell the jury something about
11
     Mylan, what happened in that case and the result, because
12
     it's fundamental to understanding what the entry date was
1.3
     under the settlement.
14
              Your Honor, thank you very much for the time.
15
              THE COURT: Let me look at my notes and see if I
16
     have anything else I want to ask you before we start into
17
     any evidence. That's all.
18
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: Then, Mr. Sobol, you're going to call
20
     Dr. Hrubiec?
2.1
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: I am, Your Honor.
22
     Dr. Hrubiec can take the stand, with your permission.
2.3
              THE COURT: Can you come up and identify yourself,
24
     please.
25
              I'm talking about the attorney.
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MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Apologies, Your Honor,
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 2
     Kristen Johnson for the plaintiffs.
 3
              THE COURT: All right.
 4
              (Witness was sworn.)
 5
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: If I may, Your Honor, I have
 6
     copies for the Court and for the witness as well.
 7
              THE COURT: I think I had instructed four copies.
 8
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor.
              I apologize. We apparently passed up the wrong
 9
10
     binders, Your Honor. I apologize.
11
              THE COURT: Give these back.
12
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor, and I
13
     believe the witness' has been corrected.
14
              ROBERT HRUBIEC, called by the Plaintiff, having
15
     been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
16
     follows:
17
                          DIRECT EXAMINATION
18
    BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
19
       Good afternoon, Dr. Hrubiec.
20
     A. Good afternoon.
21
        Please state your name.
22
     Α.
        My name is Robert Hrubiec.
23
     Q.
       Can you spell that.
24
    A. H-r-u-b-i-e-c.
25
     Q. Please briefly describe your professional background as
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it relates to the opinions you're offering in this case. I have a Ph.D. in synthetic organic chemistry. I did post-doctoral work in synthesizing organic compounds for use as pharmaceuticals. I then moved on to industry, worked for a biotech company, again, synthesizing more compounds for -to be used as pharmaceuticals. Did that for about five or seven years. After that I moved on to a large pharmaceutical company in North Carolina, which is now GSK, and started my patent career there, first as a patent agent, and then I went to law school at night, and once I received my JD, I became a patent lawyer. I worked for the company initially drafting and prosecuting patent applications in front of the patent office. I also did a lot of work evaluating third-party patents for -- to determine their strengths and weaknesses. And after that I moved on. I did that for about ten years and then moved on to a company in Pennsylvania, Cephalon, and headed up their patent department there, where besides being responsible for the company's patent portfolio prosecution-wise, I continued to advise the company on the strengths and weaknesses of third-party patents as well as advising upper management of that company as to the

After that I left Cephalon and started my consulting

likelihood of success in their patent litigation cases.

- 1 | business about ten years ago or so, consulting with clients
- 2 on various patent matters.
- 3 Q. Who hired you in this litigation?
- 4 A. I was hired by, I believe it was your firm.
- 5 Q. On behalf of which parties?
- 6 A. On behalf of the plaintiffs.
- 7 Q. What were you asked to do with respect to the outcome of
- 8 | the Glenmark litigation?
- 9 A. I was asked to review the Glenmark record from both
- 10 parties, including expert testimony, depositions, expert
- 11 reports, transcripts, court orders, and other materials, as
- 12 | well as reviewing the '721 patent, the specification, the
- 13 | claims of the '721 patent, as well as its progeny, starting
- 14 | from the -- what was called the '440 patent application,
- 15 | including the '115 patent and the '721 patent, re-issue
- 16 patent.
- 17 Q. Having reviewed those materials, were you asked to do
- 18 | anything else?
- 19 A. Having reviewed those materials, I was asked to provide
- 20 my opinions.
- 21 Q. If you turn to Paragraph 23 in your report, it should be
- 22 | the first tab in the binder provided.
- 23 A. 23?
- 24 Q. Yes, sir.
- 25 A. I'm there.

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THE COURT: Just a minute. You said tab 23?
 1
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Paragraph 23 in Dr. Hrubiec's
 2
 3
     report. It should be the first tab, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Yes.
 4
 5
    BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
 6
     Q. What were you asked to do with respect to advising a
 7
     client?
     A. I was asked to provide an opinion from the perspective of
 8
 9
     reasonable and competent patent counsel as to how I would
10
     have advised the client at the time in May of 2010 as to the
11
     likelihood of Schering prevailing -- prevailing in a lawsuit
12
     and showing that their '721 patent -- I'm sorry -- showing
13
     that Glenmark infringed one or more claims of a Schering
14
     valid and enforceable patent.
15
     Q. When you say a lawsuit, do you understand that to be the
16
     Glenmark litigation?
17
    A. Yes, that was in the Glenmark litigation.
18
     Q. And when you say Schering, who's Schering?
19
              THE COURT: I know. Before the jury, you would
20
    have to present that Schering is now part of Merck.
21
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
22
     will move it along.
23
              THE COURT: You can skip that.
24
    BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
25
     Q. Do Paragraph 23 and Paragraph 23.1 accurately describe
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- 1 | your assignment with respect to the outcome of the Glenmark
- 2 | litigation?
- 3 A. Yes, they do.
- 4 Q. Were the views of Merck's counsel, as of May 2010,
- 5 available to you in doing your work?
- 6 A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat that?
- 7 Q. Sure. In doing your work in this case, did you have
- 8 | available to you what Merck's lawyers thought about the
- 9 | merits of the Glenmark litigation as of May of 2010?
- 10 A. No, I didn't.
- 11 Q. Did you have available to you the views of Glenmark's
- 12 lawyers, as to what they thought about the likelihood of
- 13 | succeeding in the Glenmark litigation as of May of 2010?
- 14 A. No, I did not have those either.
- 15 Q. Were you able to form opinions about how reasonable and
- 16 | competent patent counsel would have advised a client about
- 17 | the likelihood of Schering succeeding as of May of 2010?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. What was your opinion?
- 20 A. My opinion was that reasonable and competent patent
- 21 | counsel advising Schering and Glenmark as of May 2010 would
- 22 | have advised the party that Glenmark had a 65 to 75 percent
- 23 | likelihood of prevailing against -- I'm sorry, 65 to 75
- 24 percent likelihood of prevailing in that case.
- 25 Q. In forming those opinions, that opinion, did you rely on

- 1 | any post-May 2010 facts about the *Mylan* litigation?
- 2 A. No, I did not rely on any post-May 2010 facts or
- 3 information.
- 4 Q. How are post-May 2010 facts about the *Mylan* litigation
- 5 | relevant to your opinion about how reasonable and competent
- 6 | patent counsel would have advised the client about the
- 7 | likelihood of Schering succeeding in May of 2010?
- 8 A. They're not relevant at all.
- 9 Q. Why not?
- 10 A. First, they didn't exist as of May 2010. Second, and
- 11 perhaps even more importantly, there were several important
- 12 and significant differences between the Glenmark case and the
- 13 Mylan case.
- 14 Q. Like what?
- 15 A. First, it was a different patent, as we've heard. The
- 16 | inventors were different in the two cases. The experts were
- 17 different in the two cases. The testimony that the experts
- 18 provided was different. The lawyers were different in the
- 19 | two cases. The law was different in the two cases. The
- 20 defense was different in the two cases.
- 21 | Q. So I want to break --
- 22 A. Go ahead.
- 23 Q. Had you finished your answer, sir? I apologize.
- 24 A. Yes, I did.
- 25 Q. I want to break that down a little. How is the patent

- 1 | different, from your perspective?
- 2 | A. Well, the re-issue patent in Mylan no longer contained
- 3 claims covering the compounds 4E and 4F.
- 4 Q. Why does that matter?
- 5 A. Well, that matters because now they had to prove, for
- 6 inventorship purposes, that Dr. Afonso was an inventor of
- 7 Ezetimibe.
- 8 Q. Was that an argument that Glenmark had made, that
- 9 Dr. Afonso was an inventor of Ezetimibe?
- 10 A. In the Glenmark case? No, not at all. They were arguing
- 11 | that he was an inventor of the compounds 4E and 4F only.
- 12 Q. What did Merck cite as the reason that it sought
- 13 | re-issue?
- 14 A. They cited an issue that was presented in the
- 15 underlying -- in the earlier Glenmark case.
- 16 Q. You said that the inventors were different as between
- 17 | Glenmark and *Mylan* cases?
- 18 A. Totally.
- 19 Q. What did you mean?
- 20 A. Well, in Glenmark, Merck was putting forth Dr. Rosenblum
- 21 | as the inventor of the compounds 4E and 4F; whereas,
- 22 | subsequently in *Mylan*, Merck was now putting on Drs. Clader
- 23 and Burnett as the ones who invented 4E and 4F.
- 24 Q. You said the experts in Mylan were different than the
- 25 | experts in Glenmark. What did you mean?

- 1 A. I did, yes. Well, I meant in Glenmark, the experts, the
- 2 | expert on inventorship, on the inventorship issue, was a
- 3 Dr. Brisbois. In the subsequent Mylan case, Merck had
- 4 | switched and changed and now were providing a Dr. Myers,
- 5 Dr. Rosenblum, and Dr. Roush as experts and, in fact,
- 6 | witnesses for the inventorship issue. So they went from one
- 7 expert in Glenmark to three in Mylan.
- 8 | Q. And I think you may have misspoken, so let me clarify.
- 9 | So who were the three experts in Mylan? If I've got it
- 10 | right, it's Dr. Brisbois, Dr. Roush, and Dr. Myers?
- 11 A. Correct.
- 12 Q. Okay. Why would it matter if they changed the experts in
- 13 Mylan?
- 14 A. It matters because those experts would be providing
- different testimony in different fashions in Mylan than they
- 16 | would in Glenmark.
- 17 | Q. And, in fact, did Dr. Roush in Mylan provide different
- 18 | additional testimony to what Dr. Brisbois had provided in
- 19 | Glenmark?
- 20 A. Yes, he did. Do you want me to continue?
- 21 Q. Please. Thank you.
- 22 | A. Dr. -- I've got to keep all the players and the parties
- 23 | straight. Dr. Roush in Glenmark, he provided expert
- 24 | testimony as to Dr. Burnett being able to make another
- 25 | compound, 8F, and if Dr. Burnett was able to make that

- 1 | compound, then Dr. Burnett would be able to make the
- 2 | compounds 4E and 4F. That was the basis of Dr. Roush's
- 3 | testimony, which Judge Linares and the Court in Mylan heavily
- 4 | relied on and actually specifically referenced their
- 5 testimony.
- 6 Q. So if I've got it right, then, in the Mylan case,
- 7 Dr. Roush offered an opinion that if one could make compound
- 8 8F, as Dr. Burnett had done, one could make compounds 4E and
- 9 | 4F that was in *Mylan*, correct?
- 10 A. That was Dr. Roush's testimony -- testimony in Mylan,
- 11 correct.
- 12 Q. In the Glenmark case, Dr. Roush also put in an expert
- 13 opinion?
- 14 A. Yes, he did.
- 15 Q. Did it address inventorship?
- 16 A. No, it did not. Dr. Roush was providing expert testimony
- 17 | in Glenmark to a different issue.
- 18 Q. I take it, then, that Dr. Roush's Glenmark reports did
- 19 | not offer the argument that if one could make compound 8F,
- 20 one could make compounds 4E and 4F?
- 21 A. He did not provide that testimony.
- 22 Q. You said that there were different lawyers in Mylan than
- 23 in Glenmark?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. How did the lawyers differ?

- 1 A. Well, certainly my understanding was that the Merck
- 2 lawyers were the same. However, in Glenmark, Glenmark had
- 3 | their lawyers, and in Mylan, Mylan had their own different
- 4 lawyers.
- 5 Q. Did Mylan lawyers offer any different theories about the
- 6 case --
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. -- as Glenmark's lawyers?
- 9 A. They did, yes.
- 10 Q. How so?
- 11 A. In Mylan, because of the change in the patent, Mylan had
- 12 to argue that Dr. Afonso was not only an inventor on the 4E
- 13 and 4F compounds, as they did in Glenmark, they had to also
- 14 | argue that Dr. Afonso was also an inventor of the other
- 15 | compound Ezetimibe in that Mylan patent.
- 16 Q. And Ezetimibe is the generic name for the active
- 17 | ingredient in the drug Zetia, right?
- 18 A. That's correct.
- 19 Q. How did the defenses differ, if at all, as between
- 20 Glenmark and *Mylan*?
- 21 A. The defenses in Mylan -- I'm sorry, the defenses in
- 22 | Glenmark -- Glenmark is on my left, Mylan is on my right.
- 23 The defenses in Glenmark were threefold: Glenmark was
- 24 defending on patent term extension, obviousness-type double
- 25 | patenting, and also inventorship; whereas, in Mylan, Mylan's

- 1 defenses were only inventorship.
- 2 Q. Am I understanding, then, that in Glenmark, the generic
- 3 | had three paths to victory, potential paths to victory?
- 4 A. Sure, yes. They had three defenses, so they had three
- 5 | shots on goal, if you will.
- 6 Q. And in Mylan, there were how many shots on goal
- 7 | available?
- 8 A. They had one defense and one shot.
- 9 Q. Now, by the way, how do you know what Glenmark's defenses
- 10 | were in the Glenmark litigation?
- 11 A. Because I reviewed the pretrial briefs of both Glenmark
- 12 and Merck in the Glenmark case.
- 13 Q. Did you review similar briefing from the Mylan case?
- 14 A. Yes, I reviewed those pretrial briefs as well.
- 15 | Q. In your report, you analyzed each of Glenmark's defenses
- 16 | and assigned each a probability of success?
- 17 A. I did, correct.
- 18 | Q. Which of the defenses did you ascribe your overall
- 19 opinion of success -- terrible question. I can do better.
- 20 Which of those defenses did your overall opinion
- 21 about the chance of success as to how reasonable and
- 22 | competent patent counsel would have advised a client in May
- 23 of 2010 as to Merck's chance of succeeding and proving its
- 24 | case in Glenmark?
- 25 A. I based my opinion on the overall chance of success based

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on the opinion regarding inventorship.
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- 2 Q. Dr. Hrubiec, if facts about what happened in the Mylan
- 3 | litigation are not relevant to your opinion about what
- 4 | reasonable and competent patent counsel would have advised in
- 5 May of 2010, why do you sometimes refer to such facts in your
- 6 opening report?

- 7 A. Well, I wanted to be complete. My marching instructions
- 8 | were to provide an opinion based on the record as it existed
- 9 | in 2010, but I was made aware of the later-occurring Mylan
- 10 | case and Judge Linares' decision in that case and opinion.
- So I just felt compelled to make -- to look at that
- 12 | case and to make sure that there was nothing in that case
- 13 | that would cause me to change my opinions with regard to the
- 14 | Glenmark defenses. I wanted to make sure no stone was
- 15 unturned so I could feel confident that my opinions and my
- 16 | conclusions were rock solid.
- 17 Q. What was it that you expected to find in the Mylan case
- 18 | that could have changed your opinions?
- 19 A. I didn't expect to find anything when I started. I just
- 20 | went in with an open mind and read all the relevant documents
- 21 and concluded that the *Mylan* case was -- there were so many
- 22 differences, and so many significant differences that it
- 23 | wouldn't apply to what was happening in Glenmark.
- 24 Q. If I could direct you to Paragraph 26 of your report,
- 25 Doctor.

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1
     Α.
        Okay.
         You state in Paragraph 26, in part, "I sometimes address
 2
 3
     subsequent events and precedent (including, but not limited
     to, developments in the caselaw and the Schering/Mylan
 4
 5
     litigation) but do not consider them when opining on the
 6
     advice reasonable and competent patent counsel would have
 7
     offered prior to the settlement in May 2010 because such
     developments would not have been reasonably foreseeable by
 8
 9
     the parties or their counsel in May 2010."
10
             Is that an accurate statement, sir?
11
        Yes, it is.
     Α.
12
         If I can direct you to Paragraph 202 -- I'm sorry, 244.
13
     Well, it's a little tricky. I apologize. Let's do 202, and
14
     it's footnote 156 that should be on that page.
15
              THE COURT: Page 202, Paragraph 202?
16
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Paragraph 202, Your Honor.
17
              THE WITNESS: Page 202?
18
     BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
19
        Paragraph 202, footnote 156.
     Q.
20
        Paragraph 202, footnote 156. My footnote 156 is on Page
21
     103.
22
     Q. Let's try Paragraph 244.
23
              THE COURT: First of all, what footnote are we
24
     looking at? Let's start it that way.
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MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: 156, Your Honor.

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1 THE WITNESS: Bottom of Page 103.
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- THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
- 3 BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
- 4 Q. Would you read Paragraph 244 for me, sir.
- 5 A. Certainly. "As such, in my opinion, around the time of
- 6 | settlement a reasonable patent counsel would find there was a
- 7 | high likelihood that: One, inventorship would not be
- 8 | corrected -- could not be corrected because Afonso
- 9 intentionally deceived the PTO, and, therefore, RE '721
- 10 | patent was invalid; and, two, Rosenblum's breach of his duty
- of good faith and candor constituted inequitable conduct and
- 12 rendered the entire patent unenforceable."
- 13 Q. In that paragraph, sir, are you making a finding as to
- 14 | whether Dr. Afonso is, in fact, an inventor or not?
- 15 A. No, I'm not.
- 16 Q. What are you doing?
- 17 A. I am simply saying that a factfinder -- this is what a
- 18 | factfinder could find, could determine. It wasn't my job to
- 19 | make that determination.
- 20 Q. If the analysis that you took in forming that opinion --
- 21 | I'm sorry, strike the question. I forgot why we were here
- 22 | for a minute. I apologize.
- Footnote 156, do you have that?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. What does it state?

- A. Do you want me to read it?
- 2 Q. Yes, please.

- 3 A. "The subsequent Mylan opinion and the upheld decision on
- 4 appeal do not change my analysis because the later findings
- 5 of a court on the same or similar issues would not have
- 6 | impacted what the parties knew and considered at time of
- 7 settlement."

THE COURT: Let me just interject something here
that causes some confusion to the Court. First of all, an
expert's opinion doesn't go before the jury, only the
expert's testimony. There has been all of this drama
created over the statements in the report, and there is

13 nothing to indicate that they would be part of the

14 testimony.

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So until they're part of the testimony, Merck and the defendants are claiming, oh, we can't defend. I don't understand that because there is nothing here that indicates he would say this on the stand. Until he says this -- and this was part of their case -- why would the Mylan litigation come in after the fact? Because you are putting the position that they are going to get on the stand first and try to make distinctions between the Glenmark litigation and the Mylan litigation.

There is nothing here that I've heard so far that would indicate that that's the case. I've repeatedly said

if the door is opened, then that's a different story. But you defend upon the case presented by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs rebut upon the defense presented by the defendants. There is nothing here that would tell me that he's going to get on the stand, and, in the case in chief, talk about all of this with the *Mylan* litigation that happened after the settlement when he's repeatedly saying here, it doesn't affect my opinion. That's point one.

Point two is that you're basing a lot of this on his percentages of success at the time of the settlement and what a reasonable patent attorney would say. Then you're going to, I imagine, cross him pretty strenuously on, how do you know what a reasonable patent attorney would say, and you know because you have that evidence.

I don't know, but I may be inclined to instruct the jury that Merck is the same party ultimately in both cases and that they have the records for what was being advised, that there is better evidence to rebut this. Because you are going to attack him on percentages that he's had to make because you refuse to produce the evidence.

I'm just saying that as an observation. I'm not saying I'll give that instruction. But certainly a jury would be scratching their head and saying, well, he's making a prediction this was going on, and what were the attorneys doing? That would be the natural commonsense reaction of a

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jury, and a jury is instructed that they can use their
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     common sense in judging any evidence.
 3
              It's 3:00. We have been in here over two hours.
     We are going to take a 15-minute recess, and we will resume
 4
 5
     with Dr. Hrubiec's testimony.
              (Recess from 3:03 p.m. to 3:21 p.m.)
 6
 7
              THE COURT: You may resume your examination.
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
 8
 9
     BY MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON:
10
     Q. Dr. Hrubiec, does any part of the opinion that you intend
11
     to present to the jury about how a reasonable and patent
12
     counsel -- let me correct my question.
13
             Is there any part of the opinion that you intend to
14
     give to the jury about how reasonable and competent patent
15
     counsel would have advised the client about Glenmark that
16
     requires you to rely on or discuss anything post-May 2010
17
     about the Mylan litigation?
18
     A. Nothing whatsoever.
19
     Q. So I take it, then, that in offering an opinion about how
20
     reasonable and patent counsel would have advised about
21
     Glenmark, in your view, you don't need to talk about what
22
     happened in the Mylan litigation?
23
     A. Not at all.
24
     Q. And so if you're not asked anything about the Mylan
25
     litigation, including post-2010 facts about the Mylan
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litigation, you're not going to testify about the Mylan
 1
 2
     litigation?
 3
    A. No, I won't.
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: Thank you.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Mr. Liversidge.
 6
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you, Your Honor. We have
 7
     some of our own binders, I hate to say.
 8
              THE COURT: That's okay. There are two separate
 9
     binders, and the witness should have two, the courtroom
10
     deputy, the law clerk, and the Court.
11
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Hopefully, everybody has it. It's
     a report and deposition and then a separate binder with some
12
13
     documents. It's a lot of documents for not a lot of
14
     questions, so, hopefully, I can move pretty quickly.
15
              May I proceed, Your Honor?
16
              THE COURT: Certainly.
17
                          CROSS-EXAMINATION
18
    BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
19
     Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Hrubiec.
20
    A. Good afternoon.
21
        The patent at issue in the Glenmark case was the '721
    patent, correct?
22
2.3
    A. That's correct.
24
     Q. And the '721 was a re-issue of the '115 patent, correct?
25
    A. That's correct, it was a re-issue.
```

- THE COURT: Excuse me for a minute. There are
  actually three. You've done a binder, and then I don't know
  what you call these with it.
- 4 MR. LIVERSIDGE: Spiral-bound, correct. There are 5 three separate.
- THE COURT: I just want to be sure everybody is on the same page and has them.
- 8 All right. That's fine.
- 9 BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
- 10 Q. Just to re-set, Dr. Hrubiec, the patent at issue in the
- 11 | Glenmark case was the '721 patent, correct?
- 12 A. That's correct.
- 13 Q. And that patent was a re-issue of the '115 patent,
- 14 correct?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. And you understand that the Court in the Mylan case found
- 17 | that Dr. Afonso was not a co-inventor of those '115 and '721
- 18 | patents, correct?
- 19 A. While the Court did make that conclusion, it was based on
- 20 a very different record and facts.
- 21 Q. Well, I understand that you think it was different, but
- 22 | the finding was that Dr. Afonso was not an inventor of the
- 23 | patents that were at issue in the Glenmark case, right?
- 24 A. Again, based on a different set of facts, yes.
- 25 Q. And you don't actually know if the factual record

- 1 | relating to whether Dr. Afonso should have been named an
- 2 | inventor was any different between the Glenmark and the Mylan
- 3 | case, correct?
- 4 A. You're asking me if I don't know that?
- 5 Q. Right. You don't know --
- 6 A. I reviewed -- I reviewed the record in Glenmark with
- 7 | regard to inventorship and Dr. Afonso, and I reviewed the
- 8 | record in Mylan with regard to Afonso as well. So --
- 9 Q. And you don't know if there was actually any difference
- 10 | in the factual record with respect to whether Dr. Afonso
- 11 | should have been named an inventor between the Glenmark case
- 12 | and the *Mylan* case, correct?
- 13 A. My view is that there was a difference.
- 14 Q. Okay. Well, could we turn to your deposition. It should
- 15 be one of the spiral-bound binders you have in front of you.
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. You have it?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. If you will take a look at Page 126 of your deposition
- 20 | starting at line 24 and go to 127, line 17. So 126 starting
- 21 | at line 24. Are you there?
- 22 A. Yes, I am.
- 23 Q. Okay. And the question was asked to you, And you don't
- 24 | know if the factual record relating to whether Dr. Afonso
- 25 | should have been named -- should have been an inventor was

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any different between the Glenmark and Mylan cases, right?
 1
 2
     I'm sorry.
        Where is that?
 3
     Α.
 4
        I'm sorry. Let me start again. 126, 24.
 5
                         "And I'm talking about the factual
 6
              record. Was there any difference in the factual
 7
              record relating to whether Dr. Afonso should have
 8
              been named an inventor of Compounds 4E and 4F
 9
              between the Glenmark case and the Mylan case?"
10
                         "Answer: I don't -- I don't recall
11
              addressing that in my report. I haven't really
12
              thought about it, if there was -- if there were
13
              factual differences with the two cases with regard
14
              to what Dr. Afonso did. So I'm not comfortable
15
              providing a definitive answer sitting here today."
16
              That was your testimony at the time, correct?
17
     Α.
        Yes, that was my testimony.
18
              THE COURT: What was the date of the deposition?
19
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: The date of the deposition was
20
     July 1st, 2020, after he had issued all of his opinions in
2.1
     the case.
2.2
              THE COURT:
                          That's almost three years ago?
23
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: (Nods head.)
24
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
25
     BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
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Q. Dr. Afonso -- Dr. Hrubiec, all of the events related to
 1
 2
     Dr. Afonso's work on compounds 4E and 4F were from the 1990s,
 3
     correct?
    A. Are we looking at my deposition?
 4
     Q. No, I'm just asking you.
 6
        Can you repeat the question?
 7
        Sure. All of the events related to Dr. Afonso's work on
     Q.
     Compounds 4E and 4F were from the 1990s, right?
 8
 9
        No, I don't believe that's correct.
10
        Okay. Let's turn in your deposition to Page 121, line
11
     13, going through 16.
12
              THE COURT: If you're trying to impeach him, which
13
     it appears that you are, the proper way to do it is to have
14
    him look at it, read it, and then ask if that's his
15
     testimony.
16
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: But not for you to read it all into the
17
18
     record.
19
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Just ask if that's what he said?
20
              THE COURT: Where are you right now?
21
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: I'm at Page 121, line 13.
22
              THE COURT: So we are going to go back to 121, line
23
     13. How far do you want him to read?
24
              MR. LIVERSIDGE: Just 13 to 16.
25
              THE COURT: Okay.
```

- 1 MR. LIVERSIDGE: So, Your Honor, to be clear, you
- 2 do not want me to read it into the record?
- THE COURT: You can. It's just before the Court.
- 4 So that's fine. Go ahead.
- 5 BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
- 6 Q. "Question: Well, the events related to Dr. Afonso's work
- 7 on Compounds 4E and 4F took place in the 1990s, correct?
- 8 "Answer: Correct."
- 9 That was your testimony, Dr. Hrubiec?
- 10 A. That's what is written here.
- 11 | Q. Okay. And so the relevant facts on the invention of
- 12 | Compounds 4E and 4F would have occurred before 1994 when the
- 13 | patent application was filed, correct?
- 14 A. Before 1994, did you say?
- 15 Q. Yes.
- 16 A. The relevant facts of the invention, 4E and 4F in this
- 17 | case, would have occurred before the filing in 19 -- I
- 18 | believe it was 1994, yes.
- 19 Q. Okay. Thank you. You testified a little bit about the
- 20 | re-issue proceedings. Do you recall that?
- 21 A. No, I don't recall that. Earlier today?
- 22 Q. Yes, sorry.
- 23 A. I thought we were in my deposition still. Yes, I recall
- 24 that.
- 25 Q. You testified that in the re-issue process, Merck dropped

```
1 compounds 4E and 4F from the patent. Do you recall that?
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- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Now, you understand that in the Glenmark case, Glenmark
- 4 | had an inequitable conduct claim related to Dr. Afonso's
- 5 | claim of inventorship, correct?
- 6 A. That was one of their claims, correct.
- 7 THE COURT: And that was one of your claims in
- 8 where?
- 9 THE WITNESS: Sorry, ma'am?
- 10 THE COURT: I'm asking you, Mr. Liversidge.
- 11 MR. LIVERSIDGE: In the Glenmark case.
- 12 THE COURT: All right.
- 13 BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
- 14 Q. And also in the Mylan case, Mylan also had an inequitable
- 15 | conduct claim based on Dr. Afonso's claim of inventorship,
- 16 | correct?
- 17 A. That was part of their claim, correct.
- 18 | Q. Would you agree, Dr. Afonso (sic), that a re-issue
- 19 proceeding cannot cure inequitable conduct that occurred in
- 20 | obtaining the patent originally?
- 21 A. Are you asking Dr. Afonso?
- MR. LIVERSIDGE: I'm sorry.
- 23 BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
- 24 Q. Dr. Hrubiec, you would agree that a re-issue proceeding
- 25 | cannot cure inequitable conduct that occurred in obtaining

the patent originally, correct?

A. It cannot cure if there was deceptive intent.

THE COURT: The problem I have with this line of questioning, let me just tell you, is that there was a claim of inequitable conduct in the Glenmark litigation, but that claim was never litigated in that litigation because it was settled. Then after it was settled, you got a re-issue, and, yes, the re-issue couldn't cure that, I know that, all right, but you did that because you were coming along with the Mylan litigation with the same claim.

So I don't understand what connection. Now you want to litigate patent law about re-issue of patents and whether unethical conduct, and maybe later on before Judge Linares it was, but, again, what you're doing here is saying it was a claim in Glenmark. It wasn't litigated. We settled it. You don't know how that claim might have turned out in Glenmark. Then weeks or a short time afterwards, you go in and you apply for a re-issue, and, yes, if it's inequitable conduct, it is not cured by the re-issue.

Again, you are trying to use belts and suspenders here that I just am having difficulty seeing the value of the relevance  $vis-\grave{a}-vis$  the potential confusion because I have to weigh under Rule 403 the prejudicial effect of the evidence and the confusion that can result versus its potential value and relevance.

Again, it's not convincing me, Mr. Liversidge, that because it was later re-issued, that that takes care of what occurred in the Glenmark case. It was never litigated in the Glenmark case. It's after-the-fact action.

MR. LIVERSIDGE: Understood, Your Honor. I think the point we are trying to make is that the re-issue didn't change the nature of the inquiry on inventorship for the Court in Mylan. It still had to make a determination on whether Dr. Afonso was an inventor of 4E and 4F and had to decide whether he should be named an inventor on the earlier patents. He had to decide all those same issues even though there was a re-issue.

THE COURT: They may have been decided differently in the Glenmark case, because you don't know. You didn't complete the litigation. Again, it's an after-the-fact finding that was never determined in the Glenmark litigation when you settled, and that's very important, when you settled it. It was an issue, but it was never determined. I don't know what risk you felt. You must have felt some because you went in and got the patent re-issued.

I'm just telling you that it wasn't litigated in the Glenmark case, and now you're trying to go in and say, well, look at what happened after the fact, so that means that everything's okay with us. I'm just having trouble with the logic. I'm not saying ultimately I will, but right

- 1 | now I'm having trouble with the logic here. Go ahead.
- THE WITNESS: Me, too.
- 3 BY MR. LIVERSIDGE:
- 4 | Q. Dr. Hrubiec, you testified that there was a change in
- 5 | Merck's expert lineup between the Glenmark and the Mylan
- 6 case, correct?
- 7 A. Yes, I did.
- 8 Q. And is it fair to say that you did no assessment of
- 9 | Merck's likelihood of success in the *Mylan* case based on its
- 10 | revised expert lineup?
- 11 A. I did not provide that opinion, no. I wasn't asked to.
- 12 Q. You didn't do any assessment of Merck's chances of
- 13 | success in the *Mylan* case, right?
- 14 A. I did not, no.
- 15 Q. So you made no assessment to what extent any of the
- 16 | changes that occurred, whether it was experts or counsel or
- 17 | anything, affected Merck's ability to win the Mylan case,
- 18 | correct?
- 19 A. Well, I don't think I needed to assess it. It was
- 20 already decided on, and Merck won.
- 21 Q. Right. But you undertook no analysis to assess how any
- 22 of these changes, among the experts or counsel or anything
- 23 else, actually impacted Merck's chances of success in Mylan,
- 24 right?
- 25 A. I looked at it from the standpoint of comparing it to

- 1 | what happened or what was going to happen in the Glenmark
- 2 | case as of 2010, so I could confirm, and confirm to myself,
- 3 | that my opinions in the Glenmark case were solid and didn't
- 4 | need to be changed in any way.
- 5 Q. Just so I'm clear on your answer, you did not attempt to
- 6 determine how any of these changes in Merck's case between
- 7 | Glenmark or *Mylan* may have improved or not improved Merck's
- 8 chances of success in the *Mylan* case, correct?
- 9 A. I was not looking at the Mylan case for that purpose.
- 10 Q. Okay. You mentioned a change in the law between Glenmark
- 11 | and *Mylan*. Do you recall that?
- 12 A. Yes, I do.
- 13 Q. And were you referring to the *Therasense* case?
- 14 A. At least the *Therasense* case, yes.
- 15 Q. Do you agree that the *Therasense* decision was irrelevant
- 16 to an inventorship determination?
- 17 | A. I don't know if I would say it was irrelevant. Perhaps I
- 18 | would put it as perhaps not pertinent to an inventorship
- 19 determination. The focus of their case, as you know, was
- 20 | with regard to the level of proof needed to show inequitable
- 21 conduct.
- 22 Q. Dr. Hrubiec, Dr. Afonso never claimed that he invented
- 23 the structures of 4E and 4F, correct?
- 24 | A. He did not claim he conceived of the structures of 4E and
- 25 | 4F, correct.

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MR. LIVERSIDGE: Thank you, Dr. Hrubiec.
 1
 2
              Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
              MS. KRISTEN JOHNSON: No redirect, Your Honor.
 4
     Thank you.
 5
              THE COURT: Thank you.
 6
              Thank you, Dr. Hrubiec. You may step down.
 7
              THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 8
              (Witness excused.)
 9
              THE COURT: Mr. Liversidge, are you going to
10
     examine?
11
              Mr. Ismail.
12
              MR. ISMAIL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
13
     Ismail on behalf of the defendants, and we are going to have
14
     some binders. Well, just to make sure I have the right
15
     stuff here.
16
              THE COURT: Got a lot of weekend reading, don't I?
              MR. ISMAIL: Given the hour I was trying to
17
18
     streamline the presentation. With the Court's permission,
19
     Merck would call Mr. Robert Armitage to the stand.
20
              THE COURT: That's fine.
2.1
              (Witness was sworn.)
22
              MR. ISMAIL: Your Honor, just to give a quick
23
     overview of materials provided, we have provided the Court
24
     some slides that are some documents that we are going to
25
     refer to. We also included the underlying exhibits, to the
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extent the Court would like to refer to the more fulsome
documents in the course of the examination, but to keep
things moving, we have the slides so we don't have to flip
through as many pages.
         THE COURT: Thank you.
         MR. ISMAIL: May I proceed?
         THE COURT: Yes.
         MR. ISMAIL: Thank you.
         ROBERT ARMITAGE, called by the Defendant, having
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
                     DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ISMAIL:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Armitage. Can you please state and
spell your name for the record.
A. Yes. My name is Robert Armitage. The last name is
spelled A-r-m-i-t-a-g-e.
Q. And, Mr. Armitage, have you been retained by Merck to
serve as an expert witness in this matter?
A. Yes, I have.
   And can you please tell the Court on what subjects you
were asked to form an opinion?
A. I was asked to form an opinion on the prospects for
success in the Glenmark litigation we have been discussing
and also provide opinions on what a reasonable and competent
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1 patent counsel advising either Merck or Glenmark might have
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- 2 advised with respect to the prospects for success in the
- 3 | Glenmark patent challenge, the '721 patent.
- 4 Q. In the course of your work were you also asked to
- 5 | consider Dr. Hrubiec's opinions and to provide a rebuttal to
- 6 his stated opinions?
- 7 A. Yes, I was.
- 8 Q. Briefly, if you would, Mr. Armitage, would you provide
- 9 | the Court a summary of your educational and professional
- 10 background?
- 11 A. Yes. After completing law school, I was -- became a
- 12 patent trainee for a pharmaceutical company, the Upjohn
- 13 Company, in Kalamazoo, Michigan where I worked for 20 years.
- 14 I eventually led the patent group at the Upjohn Company for
- 15 | the last ten years. I was a lawyer in private practice for a
- 16 | half-dozen years. I was a partner in a law firm in
- 17 | Washington, D.C., where I mostly advised pharmaceutical
- 18 | clients on all matter of patent issues, transactional issues,
- 19 and the like.
- 20 Ultimately, I concluded my full-time career at Eli
- 21 | Lilly and Company where I was their chief patent counsel for
- 22 | three years, and the last ten years I was at Lilly, I was
- 23 general counsel and had oversight of the legal group at
- 24 | Lilly, including its global patent operations.
- 25 For the last ten years, I've served as a consultant

- 1 | in IP strategy and policy matters, and, again, most of the
- 2 | clients I advised are biotechnology or pharmaceutical
- 3 clients, and my experience ranges from drafting patent
- 4 applications to prosecuting them to providing advice on
- 5 patent strategy.
- 6 Obviously, when I was at Lilly, I was involved in
- 7 | numerous Hatch-Waxman litigations where I was advising
- 8 | management on issues such as prospect for success and
- 9 opportunities for settlement.
- 10 Q. In the course of your work to form the opinions that you
- 11 have disclosed in this case, did you consider and review the
- 12 underlying patent documents themselves for the '721 patent,
- 13 | the biowrapper as part of your work?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Did you also, in the course of your work, consider the
- 16 | materials submitted during the Glenmark patent litigation,
- 17 | including the contentions and arguments of the parties?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. Did you familiarize yourself with the contentions of the
- 20 parties in the *Mylan* litigation as well?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. And you reviewed Dr. Hrubiec's report and his deposition
- 23 testimony?
- 24 A. Both his reports and his deposition testimony, yes.
- 25 Q. Thank you. And you were in court this afternoon

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1 | listening to Dr. Hrubiec's testimony?
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- 2 | A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Armitage, in forming your opinions
- 4 | regarding the strength of Merck's patent and what a
- 5 | reasonable patent lawyer would have advised a client in May
- 6 of 2010, did you consider the findings made in the Mylan
- 7 | litigation?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. And can you tell the Court, what was the purpose of you
- 10 looking to the *Mylan* litigation and how that relates to the
- 11 opinions that you formed in this case?
- 12 A. Yes. In reviewing the *Mylan* litigation, in my view,
- 13 | there was a common underlying legal issue; namely, the issue
- 14 of whether Dr. Afonso met the standard for being a joint
- 15 | inventor of the '721 patent, specifically, the joint inventor
- of claims to compounds E and F as they appeared in that
- 17 patent.
- 18 Also, it appeared to me from my review that there
- 19 | were two common underlying factual issues that needed to be
- 20 determined to assess that common underlying legal issue. In
- 21 addition, I looked at the role that the judge played in the
- 22 | Mylan litigation as in some respects similar to the role I
- 23 | was asked to play; namely, considering all of the evidence
- 24 that was available to me to reach a determination as to how
- 25 | those factual issues might have been determined and also what

the legal consequence was.

So ultimately, in my view, because the decision in the *Mylan* case was consistent with the conclusions that I had reached, I found they were confirmatory, at least in my view, of the reliability of the analysis I had made.

Q. And we are going to show the Court this afternoon the factual findings that the Court made in the *Mylan* litigation that you found confirmatory of your analysis of the strength of Merck's patents in the Glenmark litigation. Are you prepared to do that this afternoon?

A. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Can you wait just a minute. I want to check something before you go forward. There is a bit of a distinction here because an expert is not a judge. An expert gives an opinion, and a jury is instructed that they are no more bound by the opinion of an expert than any other witness except they must consider the expert's training, background, expertise, and the basis of the opinion.

But he is not a judge, and so he's saying that if he were a judge, he would have reached the same conclusion. I think it's more appropriate for an expert to say, this is what I relied upon, and I don't know if what he relies upon is appropriate since there were findings of fact in another case, unless he can say they were the same facts in this

case.

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In other words, he's using the findings of fact of a judge in another case, and experts are not judges, and they can't determine relevance. The Court would determine relevance at a threshold level, and the jury or the trier of fact in the case would then find facts.

So I'm not going to nit-pick it at this point, but I would tell you there are problems and certain messages to roles of an expert and roles of finders of the fact, whether it be the judge or the jury and the role of the judge.

MR. ISMAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. We will make sure that distinction, if not clear in the question,
Mr. Armitage will make clear in his answer.

14 THE COURT: Okay.

15 BY MR. ISMAIL:

- Q. And just to address the Court's comment, Mr. Armitage, did you view your remit as an expert in this case to give an assessment as to what a reasonable and competent patent
- 19 | lawyer would have advised the parties at the time?
- 20 A. Yes. Based on my experience doing that over the course
- 21 of decades, working as a patent attorney and as an executive
- 22 in-house.
- 23 Q. And was the Mylan record and the outcome of that case
- 24 | part of the materials that you considered in forming your
- 25 opinions?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Was the conclusions reached in the Mylan litigation part
- 3 of the materials you reviewed?
- 4 A. Yes, it was.
- 5 Q. Okay. So let's address a couple of topics that
- 6 Dr. Hrubiec raised for the Court as distinctions between the
- 7 Mylan case and the Glenmark case, okay. So the first
- 8 question is that of the re-issue of the '721 patent. You
- 9 | were here to hear Dr. Hrubiec's testimony on that issue?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Okay. So how does the '461 patent relate to the '721
- 12 patent?
- 13 A. Well, I think as we have been discussing all day, it is,
- 14 | in effect, the replacement for the '721 patent. The '721
- patent needed to be surrendered for the re-issue patent to
- 16 issue, and the re-issue patent itself issued with fewer
- 17 | claims and at least one claim that was narrowed.
- 18 Q. So as the Court has observed in the Glenmark case, the
- 19 patent at issue was the '721?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 Q. And in the Mylan case, the patent at issue was the
- 22 | reissue '461 patent?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- 24 Q. Now, in the Glenmark case did Glenmark make, as one of
- 25 | its defenses, inequitable conduct for improper joint

- 1 | inventorship in that case?
- 2 A. In the Glenmark case, they -- that is correct. They made
- 3 | an enforceable argument based on inequitable conduct based on
- 4 | improper inventorship.
- 5 Q. And was that issue presented in the *Mylan* case?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. And I think, as the Court has observed, by putting the
- 8 | patent into re-issue, did Merck cure the inequitable conduct
- 9 challenge through the re-issue?
- 10 A. No. A finding of inequitable conduct in the '721 patent
- 11 | would have had the consequence of being a finding of
- 12 | inequitable conduct in the re-issue.
- 13 Q. So what did Glenmark and Mylan have to prove in order to
- 14 | prevail on its defense that failing to name Dr. Afonso as a
- 15 | joint inventor constituted inequitable conduct?
- 16 A. Whether -- at least two elements to an inequitable
- 17 | conduct defense. The first is what is known as materiality.
- 18 | In other words, there needs to be an error or omission that
- 19 was material, and in order for there to be a material error
- 20 or omission, there would have been a necessary fact finding
- 21 | that Dr. Afonso, in fact, invented Compounds 4E and 4F. And
- 22 | the second prong of inequitable conduct is that error or
- 23 omission must have been made with the intent to deceive or
- 24 mislead the patent office.
- 25 Q. And did Glenmark contend that Dr. Afonso came up with the

- 1 | structures of 4E and 4F?
- 2 A. No, they did not.
- 3 Q. Did Mylan make that contention?
- 4 A. No, Mylan did not.
- 5 Q. If Glenmark was not claiming that Dr. Afonso came up with
- 6 | the structures of 4E and 4F, what did Glenmark claim was his
- 7 | contribution?
- 8 A. Glenmark's contention was that without Dr. Afonso's
- 9 | contribution of an operable method for manufacturing
- 10 | Compounds 4E and 4F, the invention couldn't be completed. In
- 11 other words, the named inventors otherwise wouldn't have had
- 12 available to them any operable process for making these two
- 13 compounds.
- 14 Q. What argument was Mylan making with respect to Dr. Afonso
- 15 | and 4E and 4F?
- 16 A. Mylan was making the identical argument.
- 17 Q. So let's focus on the first prong that you mentioned,
- 18 | this question about inventorship. Did Mylan and Glenmark
- 19 have the same threshold burden on that question?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. What are the criteria for being included as a joint
- 22 | inventor on a patent?
- 23 A. To be included as a joint inventor, you have to make a,
- 24 | what can be called an invented contribution to the conception
- or the idea of the completed invention, and because these

were chemical compounds, you had to visualize or write out on a piece of paper the chemical structure, how the atoms are arranged, and then you need to be able to explain to the public or at least the skilled part of the public how those compounds can be made and used.

So you need at least some operable method to exist by which those compounds can actually be made so they can actually be put to some use.

- Q. And as you mentioned there was no contention in either case that Dr. Afonso conceived of the structures initially and they were focused on the synthesis of 4E and 4F; is that correct?
- 13 A. Correct.
  - Q. So as to that question that was common between the two cases, what did Glenmark and *Mylan* have to prove in order to show Dr. Afonso invented a compound claimed by Merck's active ingredient patent on Zetia?
  - A. To show Dr. Afonso actually contributed to the conception of Compounds 4E and 4F, you first need to prove that without Dr. Afonso's involvement, the remaining joint inventors would not have had any operable method for making these compounds.

The second thing you would need to prove is that the contribution of Dr. Afonso was not just contributing knowledge about the prior art. In other words, he contributed something inventive, over the prior art, such as

- 1 | an inventive process that absent which the remaining
- 2 | inventors would not have been able to explain how the
- 3 invention could be made.
- 4 Q. If Dr. Afonso was the first to make 4E and 4F, would that
- 5 | have decided the question about his alleged joint
- 6 inventorship?
- 7 A. No, it would not.
- 8 | Q. Was there evidence in -- that you have seen on whether
- 9 there was known chemistry that could have been used to make
- 10 | Compounds 4E and 4F without the need for undue
- 11 experimentation?
- 12 A. There was evidence that without respect to any
- 13 | involvement by Dr. Afonso, the remaining inventors had
- 14 | multiple processes by which known chemistry could have been
- 15 used to make compounds 4E and 4F.
- 16 Q. Now, did it matter whether the joint inventors named in
- 17 | the patents actually made Compounds 4E and 4F to the ultimate
- 18 determination of whether Dr. Afonso should have been named as
- 19 a joint inventor?
- 20 A. It doesn't matter whether the compounds were ever made or
- 21 not.
- 22 Q. Now, do you recall seeing in the record that Glenmark
- 23 made the argument that Dr. Rosenblum tried and failed to make
- 24 4E and 4F?
- 25 A. I recall that argument.

- 1 Q. Did Mylan make the same argument?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Whether or not Dr. Rosenblum made 4E and 4F, does that
- 4 | affect the conclusions you've reached about on the alleged
- 5 | joint inventorship issue?
- 6 A. It did not.
- 7 Q. Now let's walk through a couple of places from the
- 8 | Court's opinion.
- 9 And, Your Honor, I will be referring to the slide
- 10 | deck that have been provided in your binder. But the
- 11 underlying exhibits are also in your binder as well.
- So, and do you have a binder up there as well,
- 13 Mr. Armitage?
- 14 A. (Nods head.)
- 15 Q. So let's turn to slide 3, which I think is the second one
- 16 | in your binder. And it says, "Both Glenmark and Mylan
- 17 | challenge the '721 patent." Do you see that?
- 18 A. Yes, I see that.
- 19 Q. Now, for the Court's benefit, what we are showing here on
- 20 | slide 3 is a portion of the *Mylan* opinion; is that correct?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. And this is Merck Exhibit 639, Your Honor, also tabbed in
- 23 | the binder. Now earlier you've told us about the fact that
- 24 | there was a second re-issue, that the inventorship challenge
- 25 | was still before the Court in the *Mylan* litigation. Do you

- 1 | recall that testimony?
- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. Does the Court's opinion here set forth what patents
- 4 Judge Linares considered in the Mylan case as to the question
- 5 of Dr. Afonso's alleged inventorship?
- 6 A. As to the issue of alleged inventorship and, obviously,
- 7 | the issue of inequitable conduct based on that, he's dealing
- 8 | with the predecessor patents, specifically including the '721
- 9 patent from Glenmark.
- 10 Q. Okay. So the Exhibit 689 reads, "Mylan contends that
- 11 Dr. Afonso contributed to the conception of four compounds
- 12 | that were named in the '115 and '721 predecessor patents."
- 13 Are those the patents that were at issue in the Glenmark
- 14 | case?
- 15 A. Yes. The '721 patent was the patent that Glenmark
- 16 | conceded it infringed.
- 17 Q. Did Judge Linares make a conclusion as to whether
- 18 | Dr. Afonso was a joint inventor of Compounds 4E and 4F?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And I would ask you to turn to slide 4. Is this a
- 21 | portion of the opinion that you reviewed in this case?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And did the exhibit -- does it read, "Based on the
- 24 | credible evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that
- 25 Mylan has failed to establish that Dr. Afonso was an inventor

- 1 of the four compounds at issue that were claimed in the
- 2 predecessor patents"?
- 3 A. That's correct.
- 4 Q. Again, for the benefit of the record, the predecessor
- 5 | patents are which ones?
- 6 A. They would refer to the '115 and the '721 patents.
- 7 THE COURT: What was the credible evidence
- 8 presented at trial? The judge is basing his opinion on the
- 9 credible evidence presented at trial. Do you know exactly
- 10 | what that evidence is he is basing his opinion on?
- 11 THE WITNESS: I have not been asked to have
- 12 rendered any opinion on the admissibility or credibility of
- 13 evidence at trial.
- 14 BY MR. ISMAIL:
- 15 | Q. So does the Court set forth the factual determinations
- 16 | that inform the analysis as to whether Dr. Afonso should have
- 17 | been an inventor?
- 18 A. Yes, he does.
- 19 Q. And you mention that there were at least two challenges
- 20 | that were facing Mylan. Were there other ways to make 4E and
- 21 4F, and was the method Afonso used inventive, in shorthand,
- 22 correct?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 Q. Now, so let's turn, if we could, to the first one of
- 25 | those questions, and that is slide 5. This is Page 27 of

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Exhibit 739. Again, if you look at the highlighted section,
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     does the exhibit read, "Indeed, it is clear that as of
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     December 1993, the named inventors could have used multiple
    methods named in this application to synthesize 4E and 4F
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 5
     with routine experimentation. Therefore, Dr. Afonso did not
 6
     contribute the operative method of making Compounds 4E and 4F
 7
     to their invention." Did I read that correctly?
 8
     A. Yes.
 9
     Q. What is the application being referred to here, in the
10
     highlighted section of this opinion?
11
        This would be the '440 application, which was the
12
     immediate predecessor patent to the '721, the immediate
13
    predecessor application to the '721 patent -- to the '115
14
     patent, sorry.
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     Q. Would this application have been before Judge Linares in
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     the Glenmark case as well?
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              THE COURT: Before Judge Linares in the Glenmark
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     case?
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              MR. ISMAIL: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Judge Linares wasn't trying the
21
     Glenmark case.
22
              MR. ISMAIL: I'll rephrase. Thank you, Your Honor.
23
    BY MR. ISMAIL:
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     Q. Was the '440 application part of the file history for the
25
     '721 patent?
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- 1 A. It was part of the overall prosecution history for that
- 2 patent family, yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. So the second factual hurdle that you've talked to
- 4 | the Court about is whether the method that Dr. Afonso used to
- 5 | synthesize 4E and 4F, whether that method itself did anything
- 6 other than apply known chemistry. Do you recall that
- 7 | testimony a moment ago?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Was that issue also addressed in the course of the
- 10 opinion in the *Mylan* case?
- 11 A. Yes, it was.
- 12 Q. So I ask you to turn to slide six in your binder. This
- 13 | is Page 23 of Merck Exhibit 639. Does the opinion read,
- 14 | "Even if Dr. Afonso's process was the first operative way to
- 15 | make Compounds 4E and 4F, his process was not novel as it was
- 16 described in a 1986 paper published in the *Journal of*
- 17 | Medicinal Chemistry." Did I read that correctly?
- 18 | A. Yes. Although, it was actually a 1976 paper. That is a
- 19 typographical error.
- 20 Q. So what is the significance of this factual determination
- 21 here that what Dr. Afonso used in the synthesis of these
- 22 | compounds was not novel because it was previously published?
- 23 A. Yeah. Because in the course of my analysis and also the
- 24 | analysis that was undertaken in the *Mylan* case, this was
- 25 known chemistry that was used, in effect, that doesn't

provide the inventive contribution that one would need to qualify Dr. Afonso to be a joint inventor, even if there weren't multiple other methods that were available for the synthesis of a compound. In other words, there are two hurdles that needed to be met. You had to jump successfully over both hurdles. If you tripped on one, you could not be named as a joint inventor.

THE COURT: But you can testify to that independently, can't you? If you are familiar with this

independently, can't you? If you are familiar with this paper, then before the testimony goes forward, you just tell a jury, These are the materials that I read, and I determined, this is my expert opinion, and your expert opinion is based upon the underlying documents, not the findings of a finder of fact in an entirely different case that we don't know all of the evidence that was presented.

If this is what the judge relied on, and you've reviewed it, then you don't have to say you relied on a judge's finding. You relied on the underlying document. Ir other words, you even knew that the date was wrong. Isn't that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. Just to be very clear, from my point of view, the fact that Judge Linares came to the same conclusion on these two common underlying factual issues actually just confirms the reliability of the opinions that I reached after looking at the evidence that was available

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in the Glenmark case and that Glenmark had available to
submit at trial. I did not rely on this to reach my
conclusion as to how a reasonable and competent patent
counsel ought to have been advised on the eve of the
Glenmark trial.
         MR. ISMAIL: Thank you.
         THE COURT: That's very helpful.
         MR. ISMAIL: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. ISMAIL:
Q. So just to close the loop on this question about this
prior art article cited in the Mylan opinion as being an
indication that Dr. Afonso didn't do anything inventive in
synthesizing the compounds, based on your review of
Dr. Brisbois' report in the Glenmark case, was that same
article put forth?
   The same article was put forth in the Glenmark case, yes.
Q. And was slide 7 in your binder there, which is Merck
Exhibit 328, Paragraph 37, is this a portion of
Dr. Brisbois's report in the Glenmark patent litigation?
A. Yes, with the correct date.
   Okay. Now, let's just quickly address a couple of other
things that Dr. Hrubiec said distinguishes the Mylan
litigation from the Glenmark litigation, if we could.
        Did you hear Dr. Hrubiec cite the change in expert
lineup between the Mylan case and the Glenmark case as a
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reason to -- that he did not look to the Mylan outcome in his opinion?
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- 3 A. I remember -- I obviously heard the testimony, yes.
- 4 Q. Now, does that argument change your testimony as to how
- 5 | the *Mylan* conclusion is confirmatory of the reliability of
- 6 | your opinions?
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. And why not?
- 9 A. Fundamentally, Merck in this case, on this issue of
  10 Afonso joint inventorship, had nothing to prove. The burden
- 11 was entirely on Glenmark to prove that Dr. Afonso made an
- 12 | inventive contribution through clear and convincing evidence,
- and so the fundamental focus in both cases would have been
- 14 what evidence did Glenmark have, and, in fact, to some degree
- 15 Glenmark -- Mylan had the advantage of knowing much of what
- 16 | Glenmark might have had in the way of evidence.
- So from my vantage point, the real reason why there
  was not a realistic prospect that at trial this issue would
  succeed is because of the lack of evidence on the part of
  Glenmark and also the lack of evidence on the part of Mylan
- 21 to meet that evidentiary burden.
- THE COURT: Where do you get the clear and convincing burden? You are talking about the inequitable conduct burden?
- 25 THE WITNESS: No. I got the clear and convincing

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burden because whenever you raise an invalidity defense to a patent, and the Supreme Court recently confirmed that the evidentiary burden is each claim is independently presumed to be valid, and to overcome that presumption of validity for each claim, you require clear and convincing evidence on the factual predicates that would lead to a finding of invalidity. So it's these two factual predicates that needed to be established through clear and convincing evidence. THE COURT: Where does the preponderance of the evidence standard come in? THE WITNESS: On infringement. So, for example, Merck would have had the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to prove that the patent had been infringed. THE COURT: Now we are going to get into burden of proofs in another case. That's really being clear for the jury. I'm being facetious. Go ahead. I mean, to have an expert talking about burdens of clear and convincing and preponderance, that's something that a Court would instruct a jury on based upon the evidence presented and what type of issue, whether you're looking at invalidity, infringement, or whatever. In other words, it's the issue involved, infringing under invalidity, and then it is up to the Court to instruct the jury. Obviously, the Court is a finder of fact knows

those burdens, but a jury would have to be instructed on it 1 2 and understand those burdens and then sort that burden with 3 what their burden was in this case. Is that correct? 4 MR. ISMAIL: So my answer to the question on the 5 burden of proof is the burden of proof on Glenmark to defend 6 the patent litigation in 2010 is relevant to how a 7 reasonable and competent patent lawyer would have advised his or her client at the time. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. ISMAIL: And so the heightened burden of proof 11 that faced Glenmark is relevant to their prospects, "their" 12 being Glenmark's prospects of succeeding on their defense. 13 And I believe Mr. Armitage is indicating, it's the same 14 burden that faced both generic companies, Mylan and 15 Glenmark. They both had the same burden. So there is not 16 an inconsistency between the two on this question of 17 underlying factual determinations that were being made. 18 THE COURT: What I'm trying to say, the answer 19 would be yes for me. Is that correct? 20 THE WITNESS: Yeah, it -- again, if you go back to 21 what I was asked to do, and if I understood Dr. Hrubiec's 22 testimony, what he was asked to do, this evidentiary burden 23 is inherent in that task of how you would have advised Merck 24 or Glenmark on the prospects for success because any advice 25 would need to account for the clear and convincing evidence

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burden to succeed on invalidity. And it does help inform the probabilities that you might assign to whether you could successfully meet that burden. THE COURT: Well, Dr. Hrubiec came up with his projections because when the actual information is there from the attorneys that were assessing it, did you have access to the actual lawyers' assessment? In other words, they're Merck's lawyers, and I know it was Schering, so whether they were using that burden or not and what their assessment was, have you seen the attorneys' advice here? THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: You have seen it? THE WITNESS: So from our vantage point, I have no knowledge of any attorney-client privilege communications of Merck involving any aspect of this matter. I was asked to perform what I described mainly, how would I and how would a reasonable and competent patent counsel have advised Merck or Glenmark with the ability to review the materials that I've reviewed, which did not include attorney-client privilege communications. THE COURT: So you would be using this expert to rebut that testimony of Dr. Hrubiec if he testified to that? MR. ISMAIL: Correct. And the construct of the way this question has been framed, there was an early sword/shield privilege challenge, and the way Judge Miller

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has set the parameters of this is that objective indicia of
the strength of the patent and the likelihood of success
would be admissible and reliable for the witnesses to refer
to.
         And in Judge Miller's decision on this motion in
limine, he pointed to that same question, is that the
conclusions of this fact finder on the same factual
predicate questions is objective evidence of how a client
would be advised about the prospects of success. So it's
specifically relevant to the inquiry and the reliability of
Dr. Hrubiec's opinion that -- there is an objective
determination that Dr. Afonso did not contribute inventive
efforts to 4E and 4F, which was an issue in the Glenmark
litigation and was an issue in the Mylan litigation.
         And so that's what we believe to be one of the
reasons why the Mylan outcome is relevant, in addition to
the many other reasons Mr. Liversidge outlined this
afternoon. I hope that answered the Court's question, and
then some probably.
         THE COURT: Go ahead.
         MR. ISMAIL: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. ISMAIL:
Q. Just a couple of other quick points, Mr. Armitage, if I
could. So were you here when counsel for the plaintiffs and
Dr. Hrubiec were talking about a supposed change in Merck's
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- 1 | theory as to the inventors of 4E and 4F?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Okay. So does the distinction about who conceived of the
- 4 | structures 4E and 4F change your opinion as to whether
- 5 Dr. Afonso should have been an inventor on the predecessor
- 6 patents?
- 7 A. So long as the named joint inventors were responsible for
- 8 | that part of the conception, whoever they were of the
- 9 | structures, it doesn't matter at all to the analysis of
- 10 Dr. Afonso's joint inventorship. It's simply irrelevant.
- 11 Q. So if Dr. Rosenblum conceived of the structures 4E and
- 12 4F, is that a fact whether Dr. Afonso would be considered a
- 13 | joint inventor?
- 14 A. As opposed to Dr. Burnett and Dr. Clader, no.
- 15 Q. And did -- on this question about whether Dr. Afonso was
- 16 | the first to synthesize 4E and 4F, was that issue addressed
- 17 | in Judge Linares' opinion?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And if we go to slide 8, and would this be Page 27 of
- 20 Merck Exhibit 639, does it read, "Whether Dr. Afonso was the
- 21 | first or second person to actually synthesize Compounds 4E
- 22 and 4F makes no difference because reducing the compound to
- 23 | practice does not make a person an inventor." Is that
- 24 | consistent with your analysis in this case?
- 25 A. In this case it is consistent.

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THE COURT: Would it be inconsistent in another
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     case?
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              THE WITNESS: There is a bizarre doctrine that
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     applies to some obscure types of invention called
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     simultaneously conception and reduction to practice, but
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     that has no conceivable relevance here.
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              THE COURT: All right.
     BY MR. ISMAIL:
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     Q. Okay. So let's just wrap this up, Mr. Armitage, and late
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     on a Friday afternoon. So in the final analysis, did
11
     Glenmark and Mylan face similar factual hurdles to establish
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     an inequitable conduct defense based on joint inventorship?
13
        They based what I would say would be common factual
14
     hurdles.
15
     Q. And did you reach an opinion as to the likelihood or how
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     you would have advised a client in 2010 as to Glenmark's
17
     prospects of overcoming those factual hurdles?
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     A. Yes.
19
     Q. And in Judge Linares's opinion in the Mylan case, did he
20
     assess whether Mylan was able to overcome those common
2.1
     factual hurdles?
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              THE COURT: Are you asking him how he would assess
23
     Glenmark's, is that the question?
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              MR. ISMAIL: I'll rephrase to make it clear.
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     BY MR. ISMAIL:
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Were you asked to assess how you would advise a client as
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     to the prospects of Glenmark successfully clearing the
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     hurdles necessary to establish the inequitable conduct
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     defense on joint inventorship?
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     A. Yes.
 6
     Q. And did the Mylan opinion have an analysis of whether
 7
     Mylan was able to clear those common factual questions?
     A. Yes.
 8
     Q. And do you, Mr. Hrubiec, find -- and I think you
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10
     indicated that the opinion and findings in the Mylan case
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     were confirmatory of the work that you did to arrive at the
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     opinions that you've provided the Court today?
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         In my view, they confirm the reliability of the analysis
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     and the conclusions.
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              MR. ISMAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. Pass the
16
     witness.
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              THE COURT: Cross-examination, Mr. Sobol.
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              MR. SOBOL: May I inquire, Your Honor?
19
              THE COURT: Yes.
20
                           CROSS-EXAMINATION
21
     BY MR. SOBOL:
22
     Q. Good afternoon, sir.
2.3
     A. Good afternoon.
24
        We haven't met before, so I'm Tom Sobol. I'll be asking
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you some questions this afternoon, okay? You just gave some

- 1 | testimony -- used this word "confirmatory." I take it that
- 2 | your testimony is that the Mylan result is confirmatory of
- 3 your findings, I think you testified; is that correct?
- 4 A. I think I said confirmatory of the reliability of the
- 5 | conclusions I reached.
- 6 Q. Okay. So it confirms your conclusions, correct?
- 7 A. In both cases the same ultimate conclusions were reached,
- 8 yes.
- 9 Q. Right. But what I'm trying to understand is you reached
- 10 your conclusions independently of relying upon the *Mylan*
- 11 results, correct?
- 12 A. Correct.
- 13 Q. And so you don't need the Mylan result in order to reach
- 14 | your opinion, correct?
- 15 A. Correct.
- 16 Q. The only thing you need to do is get your opinion
- 17 | confirmed with *Mylan*, correct?
- 18 | A. No, that wasn't my testimony. I think I said confirm the
- 19 reliability of the opinion that I reached.
- 20 Q. Okay. So the underlying opinion that you reached, it is
- 21 | reliable independent of Mylan, isn't it, in your view?
- 22 | A. If my view it's the type of opinion that if I provided to
- 23 | the board of directors of the CEO of a company, they should
- 24 | rely on it, yes.
- 25 Q. So be the kind of opinion that reasonable and competent

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count -- strike that. Let me make sure it's clear. Putting aside any utility, any use of the Mylan result, it's your view that your underlying conclusions about the likelihood in the Merck-Glenmark case are adequate for the purposes of advising people in the position of Merck or Glenmark, right? I think they are at least adequate, yes. So you don't need to get into Mylan in order to testify to the jury about your opinion on the strengths and weaknesses of the Glenmark case? A. Well, I would disagree to the extent that Mylan is available. I would be able to testify to the jury as to the outcome in Mylan, the common factual issues in Mylan in a manner in which Mylan was confirmatory of the reliability of my opinion --Q. Sure. A. -- if permitted. Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt. THE COURT: Excuse me for a minute. But ultimately you make the opinion, and then the jury determines whether it's reliable or not. In other words, an expert makes an opinion and says the reasons for it, but you don't testify that your opinion is confirmed by someone else's opinion, a judge's? In other words, you make an opinion based upon certain sources, and you're saying that you can make those

opinions separate from Mylan, and then you give those to a

jury, and the jury determines its reliability or whoever's 1 2 the trier of fact? So why would you need the Mylan opinion? 3 THE WITNESS: When you say why would I need the 4 Mylan opinion, I did not need the Mylan opinion to reach the 5 conclusions that I reached, and I don't want to keep 6 repeating myself, but having reviewed the Mylan opinion, the 7 common underlying legal issue, the common underlying factual 8 issues, the Mylan opinion is, in fact, confirmatory of what 9 I regard as the reliability -- I might even use the word 10 credibility, of my opinion. 11 In other words, it is my opinion, but -- well, it 12 is my opinion without the Mylan opinion ever having been 13 rendered. With the Mylan opinion having been rendered, at 14 least my view is that it does confirm its reliability. 15 BY MR. SOBOL: 16 Q. So if I understand the answer you just gave then, you'd 17 like to bolster your credibility in front of the jury by 18 putting before the jury the full decision of a federal court 19 judge from the Mylan case as confirming your opinion? That's 20 what you want to do? 21 A. No, that's not what I said and not what I want to do. 22 It's not my credibility. It's not my reliability. It's the 23 reliability of the conclusions that I reached. 24 Q. But in order to affirm the reliability of your opinion, it's your expectation that you would be put before -- when 25

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you testify before the jury, that Merck's trial Exhibit
MDX639, the decision of Judge Linares in the Mylan case,
would go in evidence in order to confirm your opinions?
         THE COURT: Who says that's going to be a trial
exhibit?
         MR. SOBOL:
                    It's marked as Merck's trial exhibit.
                    There is an objection to it, isn't it?
         THE COURT:
         MR. SOBOL: Absolutely, yes.
         THE COURT: So it's not determined yet that it's
going to be an exhibit because I haven't ruled on the
objection, but you can say assuming it's an exhibit. I just
want this record to be clear that I have not agreed, and I
have not ruled on that objection. I have reviewed the final
pretrial order, which was just entered this morning in that
regard, but, in any event, it's not in evidence, but you can
assume it for purposes of your examination.
         MR. SOBOL: That's correct. I should have said
proposed Merck Exhibit 639.
BY MR. SOBOL:
   It's your understanding that proposed -- Merck proposes
to put in evidence the full decision of the Mylan court? You
understand that, correct?
A. If you represent that to me, I certainly understand it,
yes.
Q. Now, I also understand that you did not have access to
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- 1 | any of the attorney-client privileged communications that
- 2 | Glenmark had with its lawyers in the Glenmark case and that
- 3 | Merck had with Merck's lawyers in the Glenmark case, correct?
- 4 A. Correct.
- 5 Q. Okay. If I understand it correctly, you've been -- I
- 6 | tried to add up the years that you have been doing patent
- 7 law. You have been doing patent law for a long period of
- 8 | time, correct?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. And, by the way, I didn't mean any offense by that. I
- 11 | did not.
- 12 THE COURT: Age is an advantage to wisdom.
- 13 BY MR. SOBOL:
- 14 Q. And if I understand it, you've had the handicap what's
- 15 going to happen in litigation before?
- 16 A. I have done that before on numerous occasions.
- 17 Q. Right. And when -- in litigation, if one side is saying
- 18 | something like Afonso was the inventor, sometimes in
- 19 | litigation you might want to say Afonso didn't do it, this
- 20 other person did, just in terms of trying to make sure that
- 21 | you can persuade the finder of fact that Afonso is not the
- 22 | inventor, this other person is? You would expect somebody to
- 23 do that, right?
- 24 A. I respectfully don't understand the question. I
- 25 apologize.

- 1 Q. Okay. Well, let me put it in the context of this case.
- 2 | In the Glenmark case, for whatever reason, the Glenmark
- 3 | lawyers were arguing that Afonso didn't invent 4E and 4F,
- 4 | Rosenblum did. You understand that?
- 5 A. No. Technically, no, I do not understand that.
- 6 Q. Sorry, had a method to make -- I misspoke somewhere
- 7 there. Let me put this again. Okay. In the Glenmark case,
- 8 | Glenmark took the position that Rosenblum -- no.
- 9 MR. SOBOL: I've got this wrong. Now I understand
- 10 | what I'm doing wrong. It has been a long afternoon. What I
- 11 | should be doing is my left hand and my right hand.
- 12 BY MR. SOBOL:
- 13 Q. In the Glenmark case, Merck took the position -- I have
- 14 to start this again.
- THE COURT: What you're asking is in the Glenmark
- 16 case, what the position of Merck was in regard to --
- 17 BY MR. SOBOL:
- 18 | Q. Right. In regard to who made 4E and 4F, do you know?
- 19 Let me go to the documents to help me out here. Let me take
- 20 | a step back from that, okay. So we know that Merck sought
- 21 | re-issue four weeks or so after it settled the Glenmark case,
- 22 right?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 | Q. Companies usually seek re-issue in order to improve their
- 25 | position, not make their position worse, correct?

- 1 A. That can be one reason, yes.
- 2 Q. Right. We don't know the reasons exactly why Merck did
- 3 | so here because it has claimed attorney-client privilege even
- 4 as to the re-issue also, you understand that?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. Okay. But for whatever reason, presumably in order to
- 7 | advantage Merck's position, it sought re-issue, correct?
- 8 A. Well, when you say presumably, that's certainly a
- 9 | possibility. It's not a presumption I've made one way or the
- 10 other.
- 11 Q. All right. And then when it surrendered that patent and
- 12 | the patent that ends up being litigated is now the '641,
- 13 | correct, rather than the prior patent, right?
- 14 A. That's correct. The number changes.
- 15 Q. Okay. And do we know in any way how Merck thought it had
- 16 | improved its position by doing that?
- 17 A. The only thing I know is what Merck stated in the
- 18 | re-issue papers.
- 19 Q. Right. And what Merck stated in the re-issue papers was
- 20 | that the patent wasn't -- the '721 patent was invalid in
- 21 | whole or in part because it had -- because the patentee had
- 22 | claimed more than it was entitled to, correct?
- 23 A. If I recall correctly, what Merck claimed is that it was
- 24 | removing certain subject matter of the claims to avoid an
- 25 | issue of potential inherent anticipation, which is another

- 1 exotic doctrine of patent law, and, therefore, in order to do
- 2 | that they needed to file a re-issue oath which made an
- 3 | admission to that effect in order to allow the patent office
- 4 | then to grant the narrow claims, the claims they canceled and
- 5 | the claims they amended to narrow them.
- 6 Q. Okay. Now, I can go back to where I was before. If you
- 7 | can turn to Tab 6, please. This is a photocopy of Merck's,
- 8 | Schering's pretrial brief in Glenmark, correct?
- 9 A. That is certainly what it appears to be.
- 10 Q. Okay. And please turn to Page 9.
- 11 A. I'm there.
- 12 Q. On Page 9 Merck takes the position that the structure for
- 13 | both compounds, meaning 4E and 4F, the structure for both
- 14 | compounds was first conceived by inventor Rosenblum, that's
- 15 | what position that they took, correct?
- 16 A. I'm sorry. I'm on the wrong 9. I see that line is
- 17 highlighted there.
- 18 Q. Right. You knew about that before here today, right?
- 19 You knew that in Glenmark Merck took the position that it was
- 20 Rosenblum who conceived of 4E and 4F?
- 21 A. My understanding is actually that in the trial order that
- 22 | came after this, that there was no contention by Merck that
- 23 Rosenblum had conceived Compounds 4E and 4F, so had the case
- 24 | gone to trial, it wouldn't have gone to trial with any
- 25 | contention that it was Rosenblum who had done that.

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I see. And so Merck had to shift its position during the
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     litigation?
     A. I'm not so sure that there was a shift in position here.
 3
     I actually don't know exactly what happened. But in
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 5
     reviewing all of the documents, it appears to me that, as I
     testified earlier, it didn't make any difference which of the
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 7
    main joint inventors did from the standpoint of trying to
    prove Afonso was necessarily a joint inventor.
 8
 9
     Q. Sure. I understand that your testimony is you want to
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     focus only on the Afonso side of this discussion, but for
11
     whatever reasons, Merck thought it important in its pretrial
12
     brief to say that it was Rosenblum who first conceived of 4E
13
     and 4F?
14
     A. Well, as far as I know, and basically I have no insight
15
     into any attorney-client privilege communications, this just
16
     looks like it could possibly be an error that wasn't
17
     uncovered when this trial brief was filed, which is why the
18
    pretrial order is different.
19
     Q. Okay. And then if you turn to tab 7, do you know what
20
     position Merck took in the Mylan case regarding who conceived
2.1
     of 4E and 4F?
22
              THE COURT: Where are we now?
23
              MR. SOBOL: If you turn to tab 7.
24
              THE COURT: I'm sorry tab, 7.
25
     BY MR. SOBOL:
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Tab 7 is the joint submission of the parties in the Mylan
 1
 2
     case of proposed findings of fact. Are you with that tab,
 3
     sir?
 4
    A. Yes.
 5
     Q. And is this something that you reviewed in connection
 6
     with your report and testimony?
 7
        This is probably something I reviewed in the year 2020,
 8
    but, yes.
     Q. And then if you turn to Page 37 of these proposed
 9
10
     findings, you will see there a heading A, "Conception of
11
     synthesis of compounds 4E and 4F."
12
     Α.
        Yes.
13
        And then there is over -- so the way this is set up is on
14
     the left side is Mylan's proposed findings and on the
15
     right-hand side is Merck's proposed findings. That's the way
16
     they set this up here, okay?
              THE COURT: I'm in tab 7 and what page?
17
18
              MR. SOBOL: 37, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT:
                          Is there a Bates number at the bottom?
20
              MR. SOBOL: Yes. It ends in 096.
21
              THE COURT: That helps me. It's a thick document.
22
     I'm there.
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BY MR. SOBOL:

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Q. So if we turn to this page, this is in the Mylan case,

25 | the *Mylan*'s proposed findings are on the left and Merck's on

- 1 | the right, correct?
- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. Okay. And then this is under the heading of "Conception
- 4 | and synthesis of Compounds 4E and 4F, " correct?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. Okay. Now, then if you look at Paragraph 122, now Merck
- 7 | is taking the following position: "The structure of
- 8 | Compounds 4E and 4F was conceived by Clader and Burnett. The
- 9 | structure is shown on Schering documents." And then it says,
- 10 | "At the time neither Rosenblum nor Afonso was yet involved in
- 11 | the project." That's the position they took then, right?
- 12 A. Yes. That would appear to be the position consistent
- with the documents I reviewed in connection with the Glenmark
- 14 litigation.
- 15 Q. And then if you also go back to the Glenmark litigation
- 16 | for a moment, it was the method that Afonso -- excuse me,
- 17 | that Rosenblum said that he had that Merck put forward as the
- 18 | basis of invention, correct? If you turn back to tab 6, Page
- 19 | 9 -- excuse me, tab 6, Page 10.
- 20 A. I'm sorry. You're on tab?
- 21 Q. Tab 6, going back to Glenmark. See how easy this will be
- 22 | for the jury, too. Turn back to Tab 6, Page 10, please.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Okay. At the paragraph that begins, "Glenmark's
- 25 | argument." Then it says, "To start with, when Rosenblum

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conceived of the structure of Compounds 4E and 4F, he had a method in mind to make them. He described the method in his lab book and carried it out. His method works." Then the last sentence -- second to last sentence here, "Under the law, so long as Rosenblum had an operative method to make Compounds 4E and 4F, he was the sole inventor of those compounds." That was the position taken by Merck at this time, correct? A. That's correct. Q. So it wasn't a typo or a mistake on the prior page when they had attributed conception to Rosenblum. Here they are saying now he is the sole inventor of 4E and 4F? Right? A. Again, I don't want to get into exotic areas of patent law but --Q. Nor do I. A. -- it's possible that this could be true and irrelevant at the same time. But, in any case, I would not disagree with you. There is a slight difference. The first contention on Page 9 was that it was first conceived by Rosenblum. That's clearly wrong. However, if Rosenblum conceived of the structure and operable way to make it, he could be the sole inventor. He would not be the first inventor, and, therefore, under the applicable patent law at the time, you would not name him as the sole inventor, but it's all irrelevant since he would have been, in any event, a

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joint inventor with other joint inventors on the patent.
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     Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, I take it if we -- take a step
     back from this comparison for a moment. The Glenmark settles
 3
 4
     the -- the Glenmark case settles in May of 2010, correct?
 5
     A. Correct.
 6
     Q. And then the Glenmark -- excuse me, the Mylan case is now
 7
     continuing on for a year or more to trial, correct?
 8
     A. Correct.
 9
     Q. Now, during that period of time, what do you think a
10
     reasonable and competent patent counsel at Merck were doing
11
     with respect to the Mylan case? Shall I reframe?
12
              THE COURT: He didn't say he didn't understand it.
13
     I understood the question. Did you understand it,
14
    Mr. Armitage?
15
              THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. Again, I don't know at
16
     what point it became clear that Mylan would focus solely on
17
     the issue of the inventorship of Dr. Afonso. But as I
18
     explained in my expert report, by the time the Glenmark
19
     trial, Merck's lawyers would have been ready to go with the
20
     entire case. And so the only possibility is they would
21
     continue to do some additional work. Dr. Hrubiec suggests
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THE COURT: Wait. Now I'm not clear on that

have continued on on the assumption that the war is not over

they may have changed experts, et cetera, and they would

until the Mylan case finally is decided.

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The Glenmark case, they had gotten all the way up
 1
     answer.
 2
     to a final pretrial order.
 3
              THE WITNESS: The Glenmark case was settled as the
 4
     case was about to go to trial.
 5
              THE COURT: Exactly.
 6
              THE WITNESS: So at that time the trial
 7
     preparations for Merck, to do whatever it needed to do to
 8
     defend its patents, would have been complete, and, you
 9
     know -- you asked me what a reasonable and competent patent
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     counsel could have done. One is, we will just wait and try
11
     the same case as Mylan. The other is, as Dr. Hrubiec
12
     suggested, make some changes in the expert lineup.
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              THE COURT: But the Glenmark case, when it settled,
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     was basically ready to go, the discovery was over, and you
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     are saying that then they settled on the basis of keeping
16
     Mylan going?
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              THE WITNESS: So having been involved in many of
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     these, when you have multiple Hatch-Waxman litigations, and
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     I had this when I was at Lilly, you do not win until you've
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     won against each of the generics bringing the challenge. So
     settling with Glenmark did nothing to eliminate the risk of
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22
     early generic competition because there was going to be a
23
     trial in Mylan, and that would determine the outcome of
24
     exclusivity for the Ezetimibe products.
25
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
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- 1 BY MR. SOBOL:
- 2 Q. One hypothesis might be that reasonable and competent
- 3 | patent counsel, after settling Glenmark, wouldn't just sit on
- 4 | their hands, but they would try to improve the case as they
- 5 | go ahead with *Mylan*, correct?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Okay. And so, for instance, we know from the patent
- 8 | record that Mr. Roush, he originally had a 111-page report,
- 9 and then he changed to had a new report at about 140 pages in
- 10 | it. You know that, right?
- 11 A. I've not done the page counting, but I will take your
- 12 representation.
- 13 Q. Right. And then there was also another new expert that
- 14 | came into a part of the picture, this Dr. Myers, correct?
- 15 A. As I understand Dr. Hrubiec's testimony, we agree on
- 16 that.
- 17 Q. In the Glenmark case, what did Glenmark say Afonso
- 18 invented?
- 19 A. In the Glenmark case, as in the Mylan case, the
- 20 allegation was that Afonso contributed to the conception of
- 21 | Compounds E and F.
- 22 | Q. Right. What did Mylan say that Afonso invented in the
- 23 Mylan case?
- 24 | A. The identical 4E and 4F contributed to the conception of
- 25 | the invention, and then Mylan additionally tried to prove

- 1 | that Dr. Afonso contributed to other subject matter which
- 2 | wouldn't have been relevant to the Glenmark case.
- 3 Q. Well, in Mylan, Mylan took the position that Afonso
- 4 invented Zetia, Ezetimibe, in addition to the two compounds
- 5 | that they had said they invented in Glenmark, correct?
- 6 That's the new subject matter you are talking about?
- 7 A. Yes, but that wasn't actually of any relevance to the
- 8 | cast I had in Glenmark. In other words, because they were
- 9 | seeking a common underlying issue of Compounds 4E and 4F, it
- 10 | wasn't necessary for me to look at the merits in the Mylan
- 11 | case of the rest of the allegations that Mylan's attempting
- 12 to prove.
- 13 Q. But you do know that the Mylan court, Judge Linares,
- 14 has -- a large part of his decision is knocking down the
- 15 | notion that Afonso was the inventor of Ezetimibe, correct?
- 16 A. Correct.
- 17 Q. So let's just look to -- if you go to tab 15, please.
- 18 | Tab 15 is a photocopy of the decision of the Mylan District
- 19 | Court, right?
- 20 A. It appears to be, yes.
- 21 Q. You turn to -- stay with tab 15 but go to Page 15,
- 22 | please. During the course of the Mylan Court's decision, the
- 23 | Court observed that Schering -- Ms. Russell -- it says here
- 24 | the following, "According to Schering, Russell's" -- that
- 25 | is the IP head at Schering at the time, correct, the senior

- 1 | IP lawyer at Schering, Russell?
- 2 A. He was legal director of patents.
- 3 Q. Okay. "According to Schering, Russell's concerns about
- 4 | the potential invalidity of the '721 patent claims were based
- 5 on earlier litigation with Glenmark. Glenmark argued that
- 6 | certain claims were invalid due to inherent anticipation."
- 7 That's what the Court wrote, correct?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. So that's part of the background. Then also the Court
- 10 provides -- if you turn to the next page, please -- provides
- 11 more remarks regarding what the re-issue was and how the
- 12 | re-issue was arose because of things that were learned during
- 13 | the Glenmark litigation, correct?
- 14 A. Correct.
- 15 Q. Okay. Then on Page 17, Judge Linares makes some
- 16 | observation that there was testimony before him about this
- 17 experiment that this guy, Mr. Brisbois made, in order to
- 18 | confirm Rosenblum's ability to synthesize 4E and 4F, makes
- 19 | some observations about it, correct?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 Q. And then there is a section that begins at Page 21, it's
- 22 | a discussion, and then there is a discussion -- see III on
- 23 | Page 21, sir?
- 24 A. Yes.
- Q. Then A, and then the discussion that the Court has here

- 1 on these pages reaches the conclusion, if you will, that
- 2 Afonso did not invent Ezetimibe?
- 3 (Pause)
- 4 So this section here, the section under inventorship,
- 5 | I thought you were looking over this, Mr. Armitage. This
- 6 section reaches the conclusion that Dr. Afonso did not invent
- 7 | Ezetimibe also, is it fair to say?
- 8 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
- 9 Q. Sorry, everybody.
- 10 A. I apologize for the silence. I was waiting for the
- 11 question.
- 12 Q. I was trying to be polite, so I'm sorry. I'm going to
- 13 move this along. So now there on Page 25 we finally get to
- 14 | the inequitable conduct section of the decision, correct?
- 15 A. The heading is labeled "Inequitable conduct," but the
- 16 inventorship predicate we have been talking about is actually
- 17 | the materiality aspect of inequitable conduct.
- 18 Q. Buried in here, yes. If we turn to Page 27, please.
- 19 | Further, it says, the following, "Further, with respect to
- 20 | Compounds 4E and 4F, Mylan failed to prove that Dr. Afonso
- 21 | made a contribution to invention of this compounds beyond
- 22 | their first synthesis." So that's the conclusion that the
- 23 | Court makes, correct?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. Now we are going to get the reasons for that conclusion.

- 1 | "Rather, the evidence at trial suggests that these compounds
- 2 | were first conceived by Drs. Burnett and Clader as
- 3 demonstrated by the '440 application." That's the first
- 4 | reason he gives, correct?
- 5 A. It's the first reason stated here, yes.
- 6 Q. Yes. And then he -- and that was, by the way, as I
- 7 | showed you before, one of the findings of fact that Merck had
- 8 | put forward, that it was Burnett and Clader who had first
- 9 | conceived of Compounds 4E and 4F?
- 10 A. That's correct.
- 11 Q. And then the next sentence says, "In fact, according to
- 12 Professor Roush, if a chemist had been able to make Compound
- 13 8F, as Dr. Burnett had done, that chemist would have also
- 14 been able to make Compounds 4E and 4F after routine
- 15 experimentation." That was also his reason, correct?
- 16 A. That's correct.
- 17 Q. Not, by the way, that Rosenblum had a method of his own
- 18 | to make it and was successful in doing that, that's not the
- 19 | reasons being given here?
- 20 A. Well, this is, as I understand compound 8F, this compound
- 21 | was made in a prior patent that was prior art, which was also
- 22 prior art considered in Glenmark.
- 23 Q. Right. And here, though, there is no rational -- so, by
- 24 | the way, here the Court does not rely at all, the Court, the
- 25 Mylan court, does not rely at all upon the evidence of

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Brisbois's experimentation to confirm Rosenblum's ability to make 4E and 4F, correct? There is no reliance by the Court at all? A. That is not correct. There is another portion of this decision that references -- in fact, it says it is clear there were multiple methods that could have been used to make these compounds, and one of the multiple methods was the Brisbois method. Other methods were actually methods described in Glenmark's own expert's report. So it is sort of the full answer to that question requires that context. THE COURT: So, in other words, a jury would have to understand prior art, and these are all patent concepts, not antitrust concepts. So a jury would have to understand prior art. I understand prior art. Number of patent cases. And they would have to understand methods, and the particular meaning that method has in patent law. So they would have to have pretty much an education in patent law in order to understand some of the reasonings here that Judge Linares, since it was a patent case before him, would have to have understand as a judge and as a bench trial? THE WITNESS: All of that they would need to understand in order to evaluate either Dr. Hrubiec's opinions or my opinions because we are both basing our opinions on facts in evidence that was available at the time

exactly how the trial proceeds.

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the Glenmark case was prepared to go to trial, which
 1
 2
     included all of this information, and the reference here is
 3
     to the '440 application.
              There is also a reference here to Compound 8F,
 4
 5
     which was a compound that could be made by a prior art
 6
     method, which means that if that method was useful for
 7
     making Compounds 4E and 4F, it automatically would have
 8
     disqualified Dr. -- I'm sorry Dr. Afonso from being a joint
 9
     inventor.
10
              So irrespective of what's in the Mylan opinion,
11
     these are all the issues the jury is going to have to tackle
12
     if it's going to assess what a reasonable and competent
13
     patent counsel would have advised Merck and Glenmark as to
14
     the likelihood of success.
15
              THE COURT: So even though it's an antitrust case,
16
     and it centers around the settlement of the case, where
     these issues didn't finally resolve itself, you are saying
17
18
     we would have to have a mini patent trial here and then move
19
     into an antitrust case?
20
              THE WITNESS: Is that a question for me?
21
              THE COURT: It is a question for you, sir.
22
              THE WITNESS: In -- I've only had limited
23
     involvement, but I have had some involvement in antitrust
24
     trials based on patent issues, and that's fundamentally
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In other words, the jury hears evidence typically from patent experts about the legal issues, and here the legal issues is going to relate to the -- what a reasonable and competent patent counsel would have advised its likelihood of success, and in order to get into that issue, you have to understand the law in inventorship, what you need to prove to be a joint -- be a joint inventor, which would require understanding, you know, this idea of what conception is and the relevance of a way to make it, and basically go through the analysis that I certainly did in my expert report.

It's the type of analysis that was actually done in Judge Linares's decision in Mylan, and that's how you reach a conclusion about the likelihood that that type of defense would be able to prevail. And obviously Dr. Hrubiec and I have different views on that. I stated in my expert report the basis for my views.

THE COURT: All right. But you don't have to go through all of that if you have the attorneys, if you have what the attorneys were advising at the time? I mean, they settled it. They settled the case. They settled it on attorney advice. Nobody is going to settle a case that big except on attorney advice. You've got the attorney advice, it's just we can't get to it. I'm just making a comment on the record. So perhaps the jury is going to need to know

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that while you have an attorney-client privilege, and you're
entitled to assert it, that you have asserted it, so,
consequently, that's why we have these projections and all
of this testimony, because you've got a privilege, and
you're certainly entitled to assert it, and the jury would
know that, but they may wonder why they are hearing all of
this testimony about another case. Just a comment, not a
ruling.
         Okay. Go ahead.
BY MR. SOBOL:
Q. So to whatever extent in the antitrust trial we get into
the issues of handicapping a Merck versus Glenmark
litigation, which is I think in part what you are telling me
about it, you are saying we will have to get in some notion
of patent issues with respect to Merck versus Glenmark, is
that fair to say, what you were answering to the Court a few
moments ago?
   When you say, "Some notion," at least as I understand the
pleadings in this case, you need more than some notion.
   Well, fair enough. To the extent that we get into patent
issues with Merck and Glenmark -- let me put the question
this way. To the extent that we get into issues with respect
to handicapping the Merck versus Glenmark case, if we get
into this Mylan issue, then we have to also start getting
into issues of handicapping that case, too, correct?
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- 1 A. No. Because that case was decided, and as I say, and I
- 2 | said several times, I did not rely on that except to confirm
- 3 | the reliability of the opinion I reached based on the
- 4 | underlying work that I had done.
- 5 Q. Sure. Thank you. Let me wrap up with this couple of
- 6 questions, sir. You have been practicing patent law for
- 7 decades, fair to say?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Okay. And you've got hundreds of hours into this case or
- 10 at least more than a hundred hours into this case, correct?
- 11 A. Undoubtedly.
- 12 Q. And preparing for your testimony for today, what would
- 13 | you give as a ballpark of the amount of time you've spent
- 14 preparing?
- 15 A. I spent two days in Florida before I came up here and
- 16 | last evening and sometime this morning.
- 17 Q. And the only issue that we were talking about for all of
- 18 | that preparation was how you were going to answer questions
- 19 here today on the comparison of Glenmark case to the *Mylan*
- 20 case?
- 21 A. Well, if the issue is the only preparation that I did
- 22 | related to the subject matter of this hearing, the answer is
- 23 yes.
- 24 MR. SOBOL: Nothing further, Your Honor.
- 25 THE COURT: All right. Redirect.

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MR. ISMAIL: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Ismail, if you can come to the
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     podium, I have a couple of questions.
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              Thank you very much, Mr. Armitage. You are
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     excused.
 6
              (Witness excused.)
 7
              THE COURT: Mr. Ismail, it would be helpful to the
 8
     Court if you can identify the witnesses that you intend to
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     introduce evidence of the Mylan case through and for what
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     purposes. I want to know the ones that you plan on for
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     impeachment and the ones that you plan on for substantive.
12
     Depending upon how I rule, unless the door is opened, you're
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     only looking at impeachment witnesses.
14
              MR. ISMAIL: Correct. So just so I'm clear with
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     the Court's question, plaintiffs' witnesses, for whom we
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     believe the Mylan evidence is relevant, is that part of your
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     question, our witnesses?
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              THE COURT: It would be helpful to the Court. What
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     are your intending to do? If a witness is impeachment,
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     that's one thing. If a witness is substantive, then you're
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     creating a whole additional issue if they haven't opened the
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     door. So what I'm asking you for is, which witnesses that
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     you've listed are you planning to call to impeach anything
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     that is presented on this issue by the plaintiffs, and if
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     you're planning on calling any as to start a new substantive
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issue by the defendants when you don't have any cross-claims
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     or anything like that?
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              MR. ISMAIL: So the testimony of Ms. Jakob and
     Mr. Matukaitis.
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                          They are the plaintiffs witnesses?
              THE COURT:
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              MR. ISMAIL: They are Merck's witnesses.
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              THE COURT:
                          I'm sorry.
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              MR. ISMAIL: I think part of that confusion arises
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     from the following. Ms. Jakob is a witness for Merck, and
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     Judge Miller has ruled that we should bring Ms. Jakob in
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     plaintiffs' case in chief so they can ask her first.
12
     it's our witness but she is appearing in the plaintiffs'
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     case in chief.
14
              THE COURT: If they choose to call her.
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              MR. ISMAIL: They told us they do intend to call
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           In fact, I think she is the first or second witness in
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     the trial. And so Ms. Jakob was the in-house counsel at
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     Merck who was responsible for the Glenmark litigation and
19
     the Mylan litigation. And her factual testimony would, I
20
     think, bear on both as matters of impeachment to the
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     plaintiffs' theory of the case and also be supportive of
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     Merck's theory of the case.
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              THE COURT: But if they call her, then you would be
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     calling her to impeach her?
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              MR. ISMAIL: No, sorry. If the plaintiffs call
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her, they will conduct their examination, and then we will
conduct our examination of Ms. Jakob, and there has already
been a ruling, in fact, an agreement with plaintiffs that
the examination by Merck of Ms. Jakob can go beyond the
scope of the subject matter that plaintiffs examine her on.
         THE COURT: I haven't seen an agreement.
         MR. ISMAIL: We can tender that to the Court.
was in the context of, at the pretrial conference, and we
are happy to provide that to the Court.
         THE COURT: I'm not understanding how you all are
calling witnesses. I mean, why would they be calling a
witness in their case in chief that's basically your
witness, unless they're calling her as an adverse witness?
         MR. ISMAIL: They are calling her as an adverse
witness.
         THE COURT: In their case in chief?
         MR. ISMAIL: Correct. We did oppose this
procedure. We were ordered to bring Ms. Jakob in
plaintiffs' case in chief over objection, and we are
complying with that order.
         THE COURT: But there is still an objection?
         MR. ISMAIL: There is.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MR. ISMAIL: So Ms. Jakob, I believe, would fall in
both categories to Your Honor's question.
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THE COURT: I understand.
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              MR. ISMAIL: As would Mr. Matukaitis. You've heard
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     from Mr. Armitage, who will be offered affirmatively on the
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     question of what a reasonable and competent patent lawyer
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     would advise.
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              THE COURT: That would be impeachment. You can't
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     offer that unless you're impeaching something that has been
 8
    presented.
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              MR. ISMAIL: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Depending upon my ruling. In other
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     words, Mr. Armitage would be in defense of what Dr. Hrubiec
12
     testifies to?
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              MR. ISMAIL: That does include part of the subject
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    matter of Mr. Armitage.
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              THE COURT: Don't count on just being able to
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     launch off into whatever you want to launch off in because
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     there are rules that set the contours of what can be
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     presented. In other words, if the issue isn't there, you
19
     can't present evidence on it.
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              MR. ISMAIL: Yes. And there are -- Mr. Armitage
21
     has a very long report that's part of those binders that are
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    before the Court. So there are other subject matters that
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    Mr. Armitage does give opinions on that have not been
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     challenged by plaintiffs and -- but we take the Court's
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    point.
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THE COURT: The report doesn't come in.
         MR. ISMAIL: Of course. Of course.
                                              I'm just
talking about the disclosure of the opinions. But going
back to your question, Your Honor, Mr. Armitage does offer
opinions for which Mylan would be, we believe, of relevance
and -- according to reference in support of opinions he
wants to offer that are similar to what you heard today,
which is what a reasonable and competent patent lawyer would
advise his or her client regarding the prospects of Glenmark
succeeding on this inventorship challenge.
         In addition to that, I believe there will be
reference to the Mylan litigation by Dr. Addanki.
         THE COURT: You can pass that.
         MR. ISMAIL: So Dr. Addanki makes reference to
Mylan litigation, and if you recall from Judge Miller's
articulation of the relevance of Mylan, in part relates to
the procompetitive aspects of the settlement agreement in
toto. Dr. Addanki is an expert who addresses that issue and
makes references therein. Dr. Burnett, whom you've heard
referenced several times today as a joint inventor of the
patents at issue, he testified in the underlying patent
litigation. He is going to be a witness in this case, will
be called by Merck.
         There are additional counsel -- I'm sorry,
additional experts who have been designated on issues of
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patents, Mr. Figg and Ms. Linck, who's opinions, depending
on what the Court allows and what issues the Court deems to
be fair game, do reference the Mylan procedure -- I'm sorry,
the outcome and the reports. I think I've got them all.
         THE COURT: I'm just trying to get an idea. I'm
not going to say because you didn't mention it, if some
ruling goes in your favor or if it's appropriate evidence
and they have been listed, I'm not going to say because you
didn't mention it here. I'm just trying to get some idea.
         MR. ISMAIL: I appreciate that. I hope that was
helpful in at least in qualitatively if not exactly
quantitatively.
         THE COURT:
                    It was helpful.
         MR. ISMAIL: Thank you.
         THE COURT: Thank you. The next thing that the
Court wants to take up just a couple of administrative
matters and comments, and I will be addressing Mr. Noona on
the first one.
         MR. NOONA: Yes, ma'am.
         THE COURT: Mr. Noona, you've presented on, it's
            It came to the Court on 4-12, is forwarded to
dated 4-10.
me on 4-12. Pro hac vice admission at this late date, and
you're going to have to justify it. I'm not admitting one
more attorney into this case.
         MR. NOONA: Is that Mr. Whittaker, Your Honor?
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THE COURT: So if he's so important, why haven't
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     you done that before?
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              MR. NOONA: Your Honor, my understanding is
    Mr. Whittaker will be working on the case. I don't believe
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    he is going to be presenting in the case. But as a
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    precaution, we didn't want him showing up in the court or
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     taking part at all unless he filed a pro hac vice. He is
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     part of the Gibson Dunn team. He is in the courtroom today,
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     seated in the corner over here. He is taking a supportive
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     role in the case. But it was out of formality and caution
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     that we filed that, and typically not every lawyer that
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     works on a case files a pro vac. He is not, my
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     understanding -- subject to Mr. Liversidge, he is not going
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     to be presenting witnesses or cross-examining or whatnot.
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              THE COURT: I'll take it under advisement, and I'll
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     decide whether I'm going to enter it. It just seems like to
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    me to be excess, but everything is already excessive, so
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     this is like a grain of sand.
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              MR. NOONA: We wanted to be sure rather to find out
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     that there was a problem, Your Honor. That's all.
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              THE COURT: I'll go ahead and enter it and give it
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     to the clerk tonight so that he won't waste his weekend here
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     when he could be out in California.
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              MR. NOONA: Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. WHITTAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: You can't get away that guickly,
     Mr. Noona.
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 3
                          I'm sorry. It hopeful.
              MR. NOONA:
              THE COURT: Maybe all I have for you at the moment.
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     That's all I had specifically for you.
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              MR. NOONA:
                          Thank you, Your Honor. Happy to appear
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     again anytime.
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              THE COURT: All right. Counsel, each group, in
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     other words, the five sets that have been identified, you
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     have to identify a party representative, and that party
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     representative has to be here throughout the trial.
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     not had a designation yet, but the direct purchasers, the
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     retailer plaintiffs, the end payor plaintiffs, you all have
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     to designate, Merck has to designate someone, and Glenmark.
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     It has to be somebody with authority, and we are going to
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     have a case. This case has been pending for five years
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     before this Court, and could go up to five to six weeks, is
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     going to be a party representative. That party
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     representative is going to be here every day.
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              So you need to check with your client and find out
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     who they are going to designate, and you need to let the
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     courtroom deputy know that on Monday by 3:00 so that we will
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     have knowledge of who is going to be here starting on
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     Tuesday.
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              The next matter is any outstanding motion in
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limines that have not been ruled upon by the Court may not be mentioned in opening statement. I am going to endeavor to get rulings out, but if it hasn't been ruled on, you cannot mention it. Opening statements are by law, they are not evidence. They are opening statements. They can be restricted, they can be limited, and the jury is told it's just an attorney's way of giving you some idea of what this case is about. They are told repeatedly it is not evidence, and you may not argue in opening statement, and you may only make an opening statement, and you've got your restricted time.

If a Court hasn't ruled upon an issue, and it's outstanding, don't mention it, because I will call you down in front of the jury. I will tell you that you are going past the Court rules, if it is something that the Court has not ruled upon. I would also tell you that a motion in limine is exactly that, to limit the evidence. There is a ruling required on it before the evidence comes before the jury, and as I tried to make clear earlier today, what I was saying was I certainly wasn't going to let evidence come before the jury that I hadn't completed a motion in limine ruling on, and that's all that was about. That is not mentioned in opening statements, doesn't mean it can't be evidence in the case. Juries are told this is just a summary, this is just to get you started, and they're told

in preliminary instructions, and they are told in their final instructions, that opening statements are not evidence, closing arguments are not evidence, but closing argument is the opportunity for the attorneys to vigorously try to convince you that they are correct based upon the evidence in the case.

So if the Court hasn't made a ruling, you should go through, let's see, 44 total, as I have the motions in limine, I could be wrong, but my last count was 20 from the plaintiffs and 24 from the defendants for a total of 45 that have been ruled upon. I have a short list of what has not been ruled upon, but you know those. It's only a few. So I would tell you that now.

The next bit of advice I have is that you spend your time working on, if you can, some type of stipulation in regard to this Mylan litigation, and I would also suggest, and I have mentioned this to Judge Miller, technically you still haven't finished your final pretrial conference, shocking to the Court, because part of getting a case ready for trial, this case has been pending before the Court five years in June, I believe it's June. I know it was June of 2018. So it will be five years in June. You're supposed to have your deposition designations made and ruled upon before trial, and you all are still at that. So I would suggest that you use Monday, that you now have, to do

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some productive things for trial, such as completing deposition designations, working on some stipulations, and thinking now about how you present a case to a jury, not just arguing and bickering between attorneys in front of the Court, but how you present a case to a jury. You all are experienced.

The jury has to understand the forest. They don't care about all the trees. They want to know the forest, and you all have got to think about, this is not a bench trial where a judge can sort through those kinds of things. This is a jury trial. It is your job. It's not the Court's job, it's your job to educate them. I think I made the analogy before it's like assume you are a freshman in college, and you're starting a foreign language course, and you've never spoken that language and don't know a thing about it.

It's the job of that teacher to bring you in and start you on that language course, and by the end of the semester, you understand it, at least to make a passing grade. So that's what you're dealing with here. You are not dealing with patent experts, you're not dealing with antitrust experts, and it's my job to instruct them on the law in the end of the case when they've heard the evidence and for them to apply the evidence they have to the law to make their finding of fact. You all are the ones who have to make that possible. Juries are very smart and very savvy

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in my experience through the years. They favor parties who
make their cases clear, not who try to obfuscate and stir it
all up and take their time in doing it. So those are just a
few words that I wanted to say to you in terms of
administrative matters.
         The final is, I'll give it, if you want it, each of
you, Mr. Sobol, Mr. Liversidge. I have trouble with your
name. I'm sorry.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Liversidge.
         THE COURT: Mr. Liversidge and Mr. Ismail, one, not
both, 10 to 15 minutes for any wrap-up, you can have it. If
you don't, that's fine, too.
         Mr. Sobol, is there anything further you want to
say?
         MR. SOBOL: I think the plaintiffs are content,
Your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MR. LIVERSIDGE: Same for us, Your Honor. Nothing
further.
         THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, I wish you, I
wouldn't say happy, but I wish you a safe weekend, and so I
will see you next at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning.
                                                    So the
Court stands in recess until then.
         (Hearing adjourned at 5:27 p.m.)
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| 1  | <u>CERTIFICATION</u>   |
|----|--|
| 2  |  |
| 3  | I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript         |
| 4  | from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. |
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| 7  | Xx   |
| 8  | Jody A. Stewart  |
| 9  | Xx   |
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